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EDITORIAL

A MONTHLY periodical at the best of times is not in a position to comment aptly on the day-to-day movement of events. At a time like the present any topical comment on international politics is almost certain to be out of date before it appears in print. But we are not ignorant of the fact that this subject must be uppermost in the minds and doubtless in the daily conversation of our readers. If we cannot usefully contribute to the discussion of the latest news, we may yet be able to throw some light on the causes which underlie the developments that we are witnessing, to offer balanced criticism of the remedies that are proposed, and to consider, on the basis of a realistic view of existing opportunities, what Christians ought to do. It has often been said that only a general religious revival can save the situation. From time to time there have been attempts to set it in motion, even reports that it has begun; but neither have been of a kind seriously to alarm the devil. "Moral rearmament" is an instance of the type of religious movement that apparently comes most near to striking the popular imagination to-day. That slogan and its associations therefore deserve careful study; we ought not to treat it as beneath contempt, but to seek to understand it. Is it the case that a society gets not only the political leaders, but also the religious revivals, that it deserves? The article by Professor Hodges which follows seems to us to be as fair in its criticism as it is right in its conclusions.

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Our "foreign" survey this month is from South Africa. THEOLOGY does not purport to be a "missionary magazine" in the commonly accepted sense, but we hope as regularly as possible to publish surveys from different parts of the Church overseas. These may be a useful means of contact between Christian thinkers throughout the Anglican communion and indeed beyond, and may also safeguard ourselves against the tendency to insularity and provincialism which always besets us in England.

The Meaning of Moral Rearmament

Rearmament, or the strengthening of the armed forces of the Crown, has long been a non-controversial matter in Great Britain. Political developments in various parts of the world have inevitably made it so, and the interest in it will increase rather than decrease. During the past year, however, the British public has been introduced to a different kind of rearmament, " moral rearmament," which we are told is equally necessary if the material rearmament is to have good results. Last autumn there was a great deal about this in the Press. More recently the bookstalls have displayed prominently a pamphlet by Mr H. W. Austin, the tennis player, in which a large number of letters and manifestoes concerning " moral rearmament " are brought together from various parts of the world.[1] Mr Austin's pamphlet makes possible a general survey of what has evidently been a widespread movement, and such a survey gives cause for reflection.

The movement on a large scale seems to date from a speech delivered by Dr Frank Buchman at East Ham on May 29, 1938 (see p. 62 of Mr Austin's pamphlet). In this speech Dr Buchman referred to the state of crisis in which the world finds itself nowadays, and urged the necessity of " moral rearmament " if the crisis is to be met and overcome. Behind the political and economic stresses of our time, behind even the numerous maladjustments which poison private life and make people restless and discontented, he pointed to the moral weakness of which all these are merely the symptoms. The world's crisis is a moral crisis; no other analysis of it goes deep enough. And therefore, said Dr Buchman, it is only by a moral and religious revival that the crisis can be dealt with.

This speech was reproduced in the Press of various countries, and became the starting-point of a world-wide movement for " moral rearmament." All through the summer the movement went on, until on September 2 an international conference on moral rearmament met at Interlaken under Dr Buchman's leadership. But the movement did not remain in the sphere of international handshakes and platitudes; it was brought into relation with the affairs of the

[1] *Moral Rearmament : the Battle for Peace*, by H. W. Austin. Heinemann, 6d.

several nations. In particular, on September 1 there appeared in *The Times* a letter, signed by thirty-three members of Parliament belonging to the Conservative and Labour Parties and the I.L.P., in which Dr Buchman's campaign was given a direct application to British social and political problems (Austin, p. 12). It was urged that democracy cannot live without character and discipline, that it must now make an effort to return to the sources of its strength through moral rearmament, and that only this can establish the rule of law and peace in the world.

This was followed on September 10 by a further letter in *The Times*, over the signatures of Lord Baldwin and sixteen other persons, all of them eminent in political or economic life, in the Services, or in the world of learning, in which the question was asked, " To what is the world heading ? What is the future of civilization ?" (Austin, p. 9). The letter went on to say that the present state of crisis cannot go on for ever, and calls for action if it is not to end in calamity. Such action cannot consist merely in building up armed forces and making treaties, but must involve a change of spirit, in foreign as well as in domestic policy, which alone can remove the causes of the world's sickness. " Moral and spiritual rearmament " is the real need of the times. The letter ended by saying that the Spirit of God is now calling individuals and peoples alike to find order, and freedom, and true peace in the doing of His Will.

This letter set loose a flood. It was followed in the British Press by a long series of letters and manifestoes from individuals and groups of people engaged in politics, in business, in the Press, in sport, all professing adherence to the idea of moral rearmament. On November 12 *The Times* published a particularly interesting letter from the Earl of Athlone and six other persons military, naval, diplomatic, and literary, in which the nation was called to refrain from criticizing other nations and to begin putting its own house in order. The whole future of the nation and empire was declared to depend upon this (Austin, p. 26). The B.B.C. found space for three broadcast talks on moral rearmament by Sir William Bragg, Sir Walter Moberly, and Lord Kennet, the first and the last being co-signatories of Lord Baldwin's letter of September 10.[1] The Archbishop of Canterbury

[1] These talks were later published by the S.C.M. Press as No. 3 of their " Crisis Booklets," under the title *Moral Rearmament*, price 1s.

brought the movement into relation with his own earlier Recall to Religion. The Group Movement continues active in its support.

Nor is the phenomenon confined to this country. Lord Baldwin's letter and some of its successors were widely quoted in the world's Press, and moral rearmament was spoken of in many countries and in every continent. A Viennese newspaper quoted Lord Baldwin's letter as a sign of a growing "sense of responsibility" in international relations (Austin, p. 38). A newspaper in Milan quoted the Earl of Athlone's letter, connecting it with the atheist conference which had met in London in the previous September, and taking it as a sign that the British people were beginning to feel alarmed in face of the threat to their religious and social life from subversive international forces (*ibid.*, p. 42). The Queen of the Netherlands, in whose country the movement found a ready welcome, issued a statement to her people in its support (*ibid.*, p. 49). Already in September the moral rearmament conference at Interlaken had received telegrams expressing approval of its aims from General Chiang Kai-Shek on the one hand, and from Prince Konoye on the other (*ibid.*, p. 44).

"Moral rearmament" is a good slogan. It is impressive, it is vague enough to mean very much what the hearer wants it to mean, and it is topical. It has everything to commend it to the British people at the present moment in their history. For we are a people greatly given to political idealism, a people which has made Blake's *Jerusalem* almost a second national anthem. Largely free from the fears and suspicions which make many other nations regard war as inevitable and natural, we have given ourselves up since 1918 to an orgy of pacifism, abdicating our international influence by a rash disarmament, trusting in the League of Nations and "collective security." Now the League is broken, and strong and potentially hostile forces have arisen among our neighbours. Even so we have taken a long time to bring our minds to rebuilding our defences, feeling that to do so was a kind of blasphemy, a going back upon the moral principles to which we had committed ourselves. Dismayed at the failure of the League, we searched our conscience in the belief that there must have been a moral breakdown somewhere, and that somehow we, or our government, must be to blame. Now at last we are rearming, appalled at the necessity of doing so,

and hoping against hope that the war machines will never be used. We are ready to welcome anything which tells us that ideals need not die under a pile of munitions, that a moral purpose can be infused into our national effort, and control it, and make our very armaments a power for justice and peace.

The more attractive the slogan is, the more we need to consider what it means.

On the surface its meaning seems clear. At a time when the nation, having become aware of its military weakness, is working to turn that weakness into strength, the slogan suggests that there has also been a moral weakness, and that we are to make an effort now to overcome this and acquire moral strength. The moral effort is described by a metaphor drawn from the military effort. "Rearmament" in the literal sense means passing from weakness to strength in the military sphere; "moral rearmament" means doing the same thing in the moral sphere.

But what is meant by passing from weakness to strength in the moral sphere? What precisely is meant by moral weakness? Is it the same thing as weakness in morals, or in morality? And what is weakness in morality? To this no doubt most of us are ready with an answer. We recognize that there is such a thing as being weak in morality. It means failing to live up to one's moral standards, or accepting an ideal of conduct and then showing oneself unable to attain it. Most of us are ready not only to allow that this kind of failure does happen, but further to acknowledge that it happens to us. We ourselves are morally weak in this sense, and we must make an effort of moral rearmament—*i.e.*, must try to adhere more closely to our accepted standards and ideals. The more reflective among us may go a step further, and hold that one may show moral weakness not only in failing to reach one's own standards of conduct, but also in failing to embrace as high a standard as one might. Our ideals, imperfectly reflected as they are in our conduct, are themselves an imperfect reflection of the absolute Right. And for those who hold this, moral rearmament will widen out to include the further duty of criticizing and improving their standards, a duty whose fulfilment will turn out to be an endless task. Moral rearmament in this double sense is undoubtedly what is intended by the chief sponsors of the movement; and there is no doubt at all that we ought all to be engaged in it.

If we are not, we do not rise to our proper stature as moral beings.

To some readers, however, another interpretation of the slogan may suggest itself. The moral weakness which we are exhorted to overcome may mean not weakness in morals, but (what is a very different thing) weakness in morale. This interpretation is suggested and repudiated in an interesting passage quoted by Mr Austin (p. 44) from an editorial in a Far Eastern newspaper. Here it is said that the phrase "moral rearmament" was used by Lord Baldwin "to rally the national spirit"—*i.e.*, to heighten the people's morale, and that only subsequently has it been reinterpreted so as to involve clear thinking and searching of conscience—*i.e.*, a genuinely moral effort. "Moral rearmament must thus mean more than the stiffening of national morale: it must also dictate the honest exercise of that morale."

No doubt the interpretation here given to Lord Baldwin's letter is unfair to his real intentions. Yet it is undeniable that his letter did point to "moral regeneration" as the way to "national security at home and abroad," and went on to say that "the strength of a nation consists in the vitality of her principles," rather than in armaments and treaties. In this respect it is inferior to the earlier letter of the thirty-three M.P.s, in which the appeal was the genuinely moral one of duty and the ideal, rather than that of national safety or prestige. An examination of the Earl of Athlone's letter reveals an ambiguity there too. The greater part of the letter breathes a true spirit of religion and morality, and interprets national greatness only in terms of these. "The strength of a nation is shown in the courage to admit her own faults. The glory of a nation is to have a creative message for the world." Yet at the end we read, "The choice is moral rearmament or national decay. That choice will decide whether ours is ultimately to go the way of other dead kingdoms and empires" or not. The appeal to patriotism replaces the appeal to principle.

The appeal to patriotism is not in itself an unworthy thing, and, since we are British citizens as well as moral beings, we must feel the force of it. If we believe that certain vicious tendencies weaken our fibre and that certain virtuous tendencies brace it, that is in itself a reason for resisting the vicious tendencies and cultivating the virtuous ones in the interest of our morale. At the same time, if

this is our motive, we had better not pretend to ourselves that it is a moral one. That would be self-deception and a disservice to morality; just as it is a disservice to religion to recommend fasting at the Church's seasons on the ground that doctors say fasting is good for the health. Athleticism is a good thing in its place; but we must not delude ourselves into taking it for something better. And if we are going to cultivate good habits for athletic reasons, let us keep the Name of God out of it. To bring Him in in such a context is to make a convenience of Him, to use Him as a *Deus ex machina* to get us out of our difficulties, or as an ally in the struggle for wealth and power. And that is blasphemy.

If it is wrong to do what is right because it is expedient while pretending to do it because it is right, it is even worse to do what is expedient, regardless of whether it is right or wrong, and pretend that in fact it is right. Of course, we all scorn such hypocrisy when it is described as bluntly as this; nevertheless it is a vice to which all individuals and all nations are prone, and which other nations claim to find conspicuously exemplified in Albion. The temptation to it is very strong for the ambitious; for ambition involves struggle, and one struggles best with a good conscience, and that is only possible if one believes in the justice of one's cause. There are always people to be found who are thus making conscience serve their ambition, construing expediency as duty, prudence as principle, and asserting the sacrosanctity of those policies which happen to be in their interest. And certainly this self-deception, if successful, has a good effect on morale, so that there is a perfectly clear sense in which moral rearmament might be made to mean this very thing. Naturally it does not mean this now, and never will in normal times. Yet it is conceivable that in the stress of a first-rate national crisis, such as a major war, the prestige of the phrase " moral rearmament " might be used to cover a campaign of this kind. " Moral rearmament " would thus become a branch of national service, its aim being to keep up our fighting spirit by giving us confidence in our own rectitude. In such a moment, the real virtues of truth-seeking and the pursuit of justice might come to be denounced in the very name of moral rearmament itself, as undermining the national unity.

This is a nightmare: perhaps it is only a nightmare. The moral rearmament movement to-day, taken as a whole and

in the light of the intentions of its leaders, is no doubt a genuine moral and religious movement. As such it is to be welcomed, and we ought all to take to heart its lesson, that nations are composed of individual men and women, and that the reform of politics can only be begun by individual self-examination. It drives us back to recognition and confession of the evil with which we are encompassed, the evil which is the reason why movements of social and political idealism, like the movement represented by the League of Nations, so often fail of their object. After the optimism of the liberal era, an optimism which, as we can now see, reached its outrageous peak in the Wilsonian episode, we need to be reminded of this. It is not that man is all evil. There is much in his deeds and more in his aims that is noble. But all his good is captive in evil forms, defaced by ignorance and prejudice, and defiled by unworthy motives. This is true of nations as much as of individuals, and we need to remember this especially to-day, when there is a strong tendency among us to take a line in foreign politics on grounds of principle, " sanctity of treaties," " freedom of small nations," and the like. The foreigner sees, if we do not, how much in our stand for principle is pride, self-righteousness, and self-interest, and how much in our vaunted freedom and respect for the voluntary method in defence is luxury and sloth. Our minds are darkened so that we cannot see our true condition, and our wills are paralysed so that we cannot effectively cast off the evil that we see. Every gathering of forces for good calls up a wave of cynicism and despair in answer to it.

A merely moral movement, however, can do nothing to remedy this. Moral rearmament, if it is to be merely moral, will be no more effective than Rotary and other such movements of impotent and uninstructed goodwill, which lead to handshakes and lunch-time lectures, and to little more. The movement can only be worth while if it is one of *spiritual* rearmament, for which the formula was laid down long ago by St Paul in a passage which ought to be our text in all our meditations on the matter (Eph. vi, 10-18). And even this passage will be misleading, especially in a Pelagian-minded nation like our own, unless it is read against the background of St Paul's earlier writings, in which the meaning of " faith " is made clear to the point of paradox. The secret of the moral and spiritual life in Christianity is not that we do anything, but that we have something done

to us, something whose full bearings we never comprehend, but which invests our own activities with a significance and an effectiveness not otherwise conceivable. Further, St Paul was aware, as his later admirers have not always been, that what we have done to us is not merely a process of moral regeneration, but also a process of enlightenment. Baptism and confirmation in the early Church were sacraments of enlightenment (φωτισμός), and the gifts of the Holy Ghost in confirmation are still said to include knowledge, counsel, wisdom, and understanding. Is not this inevitable? Before we can act as Christians, we must, of course, submit to instruction, and the first step in moral and spiritual rearmament must be a readiness to receive it, an intellectual self-naughting, a death to our present notions in the hope of an intellectual rebirth:

accende lumen sensibus.

This has a moral for the present moment. To-day the British people and government are seeking a policy in face of European unrest, and the policy which seems to be gathering favour is that of keeping the peace by piling up deterrents around the possible war-maker. Peace-making is blessed, we know; but the blessing attaches to a peace-making which is more than the mere prevention of strife. Some of us learned last September, if we had not known it before, that it is not possible to pray for peace unless you pray first for justice. And this raises a tidal wave of difficulties. For what is justice in international affairs? What is justice as between the members of one nation? Many people amuse themselves with drawing out abstract principles which they say embody it, and certain people—viz., the philosophers—are compelled to keep on doing this, for it is part of their business. But abstract justice is inapplicable in concrete situations just because it is abstract. What we find in the concrete is always justice embodied in some particular social order and system of law. Internationally we find not even this: for where is the society of nations, and where is there an effective international law? One could think of several different ways of drawing the map, all plausibly defensible on abstract principles. The question could be settled if there were in existence an actual community of nations, for then the problem would be to establish justice in those terms in which the existing international order was conceived and built. But in fact there is neither

community nor law; for there is no sovereign bearing the sword to ensure that governments " perform their covenants made," and covenants without the sword are observed only so long as interest prescribes. This is the natural result of anarchy, and nothing is gained by striking moral attitudes about it. Such fragments of order as do emerge are the transient result of a temporary balance of power, or of the temporarily uncontested ascendancy of some one power in a given region. Now what, in face of all this, can or should the Christian mean by praying and working for justice ?

It is believed by the ordinary man, and even by the ordinary Christian, that Christianity obliges its adherents to believe uncritically and sentimentally in the goodness of man and in the substantiality of the moral principles commonly proclaimed. It would be truer to say that this is what Christianity forbids us to do. It commands us to have the courage to see the facts about ourselves and others, and to adopt a pretty thorough scepticism about professed principles. Behind the most consistent-seeming and well-argued policies it is possible to discover an un-Christian optimism, or an un-Christian hatred or jealousy or fear of other nations, or even an illogical blend of the two. As we look critically round the political scene, there is apparently nothing which can stand up to criticism—nothing, that is to say, in the shape of a definite principle and policy. Nothing is left but a certain spirit of reasonableness, a spirit pliable to circumstances like a Lesbian rule, hard to interpret, and quite sure to be generally misunderstood. It needs an intellectual and spiritual battle to acquire this spirit, and no less a battle to retain it, amid specious arguments for dogmatic systems on the one hand, and strong passions of resentment and fear on the other. Yet it seems to be the only guiding light we have.

What is true in international affairs is hardly less true in the affairs of our own nation. The same bewilderment arises as soon as we touch any of the great questions which agitate the public mind, questions about the proper distribution of wealth, of power, of leisure, about the place of religion in education, the relation between Church and State, and other matters of this kind. Here, too, the Christian is commonly expected to swallow, on principle, the most optimistic and sentimental view that can be found, and here too his real business is the opposite of this, to keep a clear

head and an open eye for the traces of prejudice and hypocrisy and escapism behind the prevailing slogans. Not that he can never identify himself with any of the prevailing views; on the contrary, he will be able to accept very many of them as apparently true and just as far as they go, while rejecting others as apparently false and unjust. But his judgments will be tentative, undogmatic, seasoned by a salutary scepticism about the all-sufficiency of any one doctrine or the certain success of even the finest scheme in practice.

There is an opposite extreme which is equally to be avoided. The Christian may stand so far aloof from public affairs as to lose interest in them. There are plenty of people who say that Christianity is the solution of the world's problems, and yet never trouble to think out either the problems or the solution; they seem to regard Christianity as a sort of magic of goodwill which will do everything for us while we wait. There is more than a trace of this belief in Christian magic in the literature of the moral rearmament movement, even in the writings of its leaders, who may be presumed to weigh their words. Lord Baldwin's letter in particular is suspiciously glib and optimistic. Of course, this superstition is very widespread in popular Christianity. Nevertheless, it is not Christian, it is even anti-Christian; for it is an escape instead of an attempt to grapple with the problem. It is essential that Christians should think out their position in all matters where they have a responsibility for action; and after all, by virtue of their knowledge of the revealed Will of God, they are in some ways better equipped for the task than anyone else. On the other hand, their duty of challenging what others take for granted will make their progress slower and their conclusions less striking or impressive; and if even a corporate effort of Christian thought were now to be launched, it might well be that for the space of a generation such an effort would produce mainly negative results.

My contention is that such a corporate effort is what is now needed, and that Christians ought now, before anything else, to take stock of their position and think out afresh the meaning and implications of their creed. It is from social problems that the most obvious need arises, because ours is a generation especially concerned about problems of society; but it would be impossible to go far into these without coming out into the fields of philosophy and theology,

where first principles are discussed. The presentation of the faith to the modern world is hampered by the intellectual vapidity of its adherents, a vapidity which is the result of past over-confidence and sloth. If moral rearmament is to mean anything effective, it must mean for Christians an attempt to recover, in dependence upon God, that intellectual vitality without which moral action must succumb to sentiment and tabu.

H. A. Hodges.

The Theology of Morals

No so-called branch of theology is a separate science sufficient to itself, and moral theology perhaps least of all. We understand by it the systematic description of human duty, as human duty is interpreted in the context of Christian faith. Even this is too wide a description: for the duties of prayer and spiritual self-discipline in their more intimate detail are certainly duties, yet they belong to mystical and ascetical theology; while sociology is also reckoned a distinct science, yet it deals with a tissue of human duties. Whatever lies between these two extremes is the subject-matter of moral theology. It has been found convenient to group certain questions under the one heading, and the convenience still exists.

Moralism, no doubt, is a serious danger, particularly to moral theologians: if we begin to think that Christianity is a system of duties, we have relapsed into Pharisaism. But for Christians as for everyone else there exists the problem, "What should A do?" And unless we can resolve our perplexities, we are hindered from drawing on the sources of grace, for who will be a martyr in a cause concerning which he stands in doubt? And what martyr would be justified in bleeding for an unexamined idea? Now it is to the martyr conception of obedience that the gospel summons us. Are there duties which I owe to God because He is God and I am a man? Let me know what these are, and I will faithfully implore His aid to enable me to fulfil them.

The realities in which moral truth is founded were marked out by our Lord in His answer to the divorce question. The relation of the sexes, said He, was established by the Creator through the fashion in which men were made.

Israel through unspirituality (hardness of heart) had fallen to a lower custom, which Moses had regularized. He Himself proclaims a return to perfection—to the full intention of God. This is the doctrine of St Paul also. Put off, he enjoins, the old man corrupt through sinful lusts, and put on the new, who is being restored to knowledge, renewed after the pattern of his Creator. Christ recovers to man his true nature, and the recovery of that nature is the recovery of knowledge—knowledge of God, and knowledge of ourselves. If the likeness of God is straightened out in us again, it shows us both what God is, and what He intends us to do in imitation of Him, within the assigned limits of our being.

Moral theology, then, reposes on what human nature is, and on what, being such, it owes to God. And this stands, even though we do not place a literal interpretation on the Genesis story. Our Lord says, "In the beginning . . ." but the principle of His argument will hold good so long as the production of the human race is allowed to have behind it a unitary divine intention, an intention which man could have known to some extent by sincerely reflecting upon his own existence, which he failed to recognize through "hardness of heart," and which is recovered in the restoration of humanity in Christ. But while this doctrine is independent of a superstitious view of Genesis, it is vain to pretend that it is independent of the whole account which as intelligent men we give ourselves of the universe, and of man's place in it. There is a popular perversion of evolutionism which supposes that it is no longer respectable to think of man as a definite species: species continually change, and "man" is the name for a certain series, or direction, of changes. Civilization develops through endless phases, and man is always the man of the moment.

Were this true, no code of morals could be put forward for man in general. Monogamy might be proper for Palestinians of the first century, and a temperate promiscuity for us; and so with other precepts. But it is not true. Biological evolution tends to the production of types which have a relative stability. If our biological type shifts, it will surely not be along the line of an artificial civilization, but by the abandonment of a worked-out course of development, and a jump into some growth upon which our elaborated culture could not be grafted. If that ever happened, there might be a new creature. We have

nothing to do with him. He might or might not be capable of a revelation; if he were, he would need one other than ours. There is nothing to be said for regarding human history as the development of new species. It is always variations on the theme—what, in the world in which we are placed, are we to make of the species that we are? It is reasonable, then, to suppose a single divine charter for the human race, which, if not the endowment of Adam, is still the vocation of his offspring.

The theme is constant, but the variations are unending: man cannot be understood out of his historical phase. We must, then, distinguish as best we can between what belongs to manhood wherever it is not frustrated, and what to the legitimate variety of cultures. It was the duty of St Paul's women to veil their heads, it may not be the duty of ours. But it is another matter when people begin to suggest that (say) the Christian family does not fit into the present structure of society. So much the worse for the family? No, so much the worse for the society: a society which has economic discouragements for marriage at a reasonable age, which denies to many the privacy or accommodation of a home, which acclimatizes its members to mass-pleasures, mass-labour, mass-emotions—the subject is a well-worn one, but will serve for illustration. We have to determine, first, what is the essentially human in all circumstances, and, second, what is consequentially human in these or those.

The gifts of grace recover to us the pattern of true nature, and enable us to develop its capacity beyond what nature can. But where and how, in fact, are we to find the moral truth that springs from these, and realize in knowledge what we have by redemption? We have, says St Paul, the mind of Christ. But if this is a possession, how do we lay our hand on it? Some have taken their stand on the letter of Scripture, others on the inward light of the conscience. Scripture alone is no sufficient guide to the problem, "What should A do?" here and now; while to follow conscience alone is to desert historical revelation altogether, and to be each his own Moses.

If we hold that grace restores and perfects nature, we must also hold that Christ restores and perfects natural moral "sense" or "reason" (call it which you will). The experience of accepting Christ is the experience of finding our moral reason rising into harmony with Christ's

maxims, with the spirit of His life and the beauty of His death. If we could only hold our reason there, while it judges the questions Christ has not judged, or applies the principles that He outlined! Turning from Him to ourselves we slip again; our regenerated mind is more receptive than creative; we can love the good where Christ has revealed it: we cannot design it with a firm hand elsewhere, not even when we have prayed. And this not only through imperfect spirituality, but also through lack of prudence, and misunderstanding of the issues involved in a given question.

Yet it is certain there can be no other authority than the moral reason lifted into harmony with the mind of Christ; to guide this reason the Holy Ghost is given. Yet whose reason? The task of knowing the truth is co-operative: we look for it in the Body of Christ. We have to use our reason, and yet that reason can be illuminated by the reason of others, and can be lifted to their truth as it can be lifted to the truth of Christ. And, where our own powers of observation and thought are not adequate to a question, we are bound to trust the opinion which we have cause to think most widely based, most Christian, and most wise; and to consider every opinion that has weighty backing of this kind.

The mind of the Church of Christ, more particularly in moral questions, is like a more elaborate, more unwieldy, immensely more slow, yet far more sure, copy of the individual mind. The individual mind is not made up immediately and intuitively on difficult questions: moral views and sentiments develop themselves, and only after much reflection and various experiences does one come to prevail. Meanwhile, and before a solid conviction is reached, we may be forced to act on a provisional conclusion: a procedure which by no means need prejudice the issue, but rather stimulate the internal debate. So it is with the mind of the Church, except that here the debate is not internal but external, and the several views are incarnated in several men. Christ has promised that His Church shall not fail, and that the Spirit shall lead her into the full truth. We do not find that He has guaranteed her against falling into false conclusions by the way, or promised her oracular certainty on every question as soon as it is raised. On some questions there has come to be a settled mind in the whole Catholic Church, which affords us practical certainty. And, where certainty is not forthcoming,

it is often the duty of ecclesiastical authority to legislate, because interim corporate agreement is necessary for practical reasons. It is then the duty of the Christian to obey, unless he has invincible scruples of the sincerest kind. But it is not his duty to stop thinking (or writing with due discretion): since how else is approach to be made to a surer conclusion?

The duty, then, of the moral theologian may be threefold. First, as a lawyer, he can establish what moral church legislation is in force, and what it means, and how it applies to instances. His second function is like that of the so-called "voice of conscience"—of the memory-conscience, that is, the conscience which shows a red light when we are about to go against a principle that we have already accepted and formed into an habitual belief. So the moral theologian must be the memory-conscience of the Church, and through historical knowledge keep to the fore conclusions formerly agreed. Yet we know that the memory-conscience has no licence to be uncritical: I have always to consider whether the former decision really covers the new instance, or whether new circumstances have not produced a new question—as is the case with the morals of war. There was, perhaps, in the later medieval period, an agreed mind on this subject. War was an evil, but justifiable as means to the avoidance of a greater evil. It is now fairly asked whether war has not so changed its character as to make this doctrine inapplicable. No one could justify *a given war* as a means to immediate good. We think of war as a threat, a sanction, which produces good rather in so far as it is not applied (for it stabilizes legitimate sovereignties): but which must, alas, be applied if challenged by aggression, though its application is an almost unmixed evil in itself and in its consequences: as with deterrent punishment of criminals, which does harm in the main to its victims, and good only to those that are deterred, and fails the more of its purpose the more it is used. Can war be justified in this sense? This may appear to be quite a new question, and not soluble by appeal to the past.

This brings us to the third function of the moralist—to act as a part of the reasoning function of the Church's mind, through which new issues are determined. Here he does not speak with authority, or only with the so-called authority of the expert; and experts disagree. He is not so much an

authority, as a disputant worth hearing. There cannot, indeed, be experts in morals as there are experts in physics. The moralist can (in this function) supply data only to the saint, who, when he has fully understood, is the better judge.

As soon as moral theology becomes a science, the faculty is sure to be staffed in the main with men who have more learning than wisdom, and less spirituality than either. And so the danger arises that the scribes will copy one another down, and the traditions of lawyers be set up as the mind of Christ; that there will be no discrimination made between the by-laws of former authority and the agreed conscience of the Church; that the opinions of the half-Christian majority that has thronged her doors since Constantine will be codified alongside the doctrine of the saints, if only they have managed here and there to influence the ecclesiastical statute book. Against this evil stands the Protestant denunciation of a secularized Church. Everything must be referred back to the original criterion, and judged by the gospel, as the Lord used the law of love to judge the case-law of the rabbis; it must be proved—tested, that is, not demonstrated—by Scripture. This vital requirement in no way sets aside the need of learning; it only demands that the learned should be Christians, in mind as well as in heart. Nor does it provide any simple panacea, any formulated remedy. Faithfulness to the mind of Christ is not to be secured by a fetishistic attachment to the text of the New Testament, read with or without Calvin's commentaries.

The contents of moral theology allow of a simple division —on the one hand rules and precepts, on the other the principles for their application. It is one thing to have a law, it is another thing to know, as the Scripture says, how to use it lawfully; and it is here that the principal difference between Christianity and Pharisaism arises. The error of the Pharisees did not lie in the effort to think their morals out and discover the bearing of general precepts on particular instances. Such an effort is absolutely necessary, and how far it is to be carried is simply a practical question. At what point does detailed systematization begin to defeat its own uses? To make moral pedants of us, and to obscure the real situation which confronts us, instead of illuminating it? The point is hard to fix: but wherever it lies, it is the point at which we ought to stop. The Pharisees did pass

that point; but our Lord blames them not so much for this, as for their principles of application—for setting aside the law of God in order to hold fast a man-made tradition, for wrongly estimating the weight of several precepts where precepts seemed to conflict.

Readers of the Bishop of Oxford's moral works are likely to infer from his lucid discussions that it is in principles of application that moral theology is now strong, while it is comparatively weak in positive law. In the first centuries of Christianity it was otherwise: the Church was clear in her moral requirements, but clumsy in dealing with consciences. She knew what Christ demanded, in times and circumstances not so far removed from the apostolic. But she had not mastered the philosophic and psychological subtleties of the structure and working of the human conscience. Yet with patience and goodwill these were bound to emerge; and once known are known for ever, being in scope timeless and universal, and valid so long as man is man. It is far otherwise with positive precepts. Some of these, indeed, belong also to man as man, but it is not about them that there is sharp perplexity in Christian minds. It is about those that define the duties of the human creature in relation to a changing environment. Whether the case of contraception is altered by cultural changes, since St Thomas pronounced against *venena sterilitatis*; whether we have to say " So much the worse for his maxim " or " So much the worse for our culture "; how (if we accept the latter alternative) individual Christians are to behave themselves in this culture, until it can be amended. When is capitalism not the sin of usury? What (as a writer in THEOLOGY was lately discussing) is a reasonable standard of life, and where does criminal luxury begin?

About these burning questions, is there a Christian law worthy of respect? And until there is, will Christianity itself be respected? One has only to think of these problems to see how utterly barren and lacking even in superficial plausibility is the solution: " Every Christian must think them out for himself in view of his own circumstances." No doubt, until we have better guidance, we cannot do otherwise; but most of us will certainly arrive at false conclusions. The appeal to " a man's own circumstances " is simply evasive, for these are not questions on which Christians can afford to disagree, nor do they turn on what is peculiar to this man's circumstances or that man's.

Everyone knows the strength lent to Roman Catholicism by a hard-and-fast rule, anyhow on some questions. It may be that Rome, confronted with the dilemma between clear definition and avoidance of error, is sometimes inclined to prefer the more practical alternative, and in this is not to be imitated. But that is no excuse for our abandonment of the effort to surmount the dilemma and reach definition; and the pity of the present state of affairs is that there is among us so little moral theology at all which is both learned in the past and concerned with the present.

For whom is moral theology? First (if what we have just said be true) for moral theologians: it cannot be well taught while it needs to be rethought. Second, for confessors: and if all parish priests have to exercise this office as a court of first instance, then there ought to be men in every diocese who specialize, to whom confessors can refer and penitents be referred. But third, for the whole Christian people: for they need to be helped in the formation of a sound judgment and saved from the unwitting commission of harmful acts, and parochial preaching ought to be of such a kind as to serve this end, so far as definitions are available, and to stimulate thought within the limits of moral probability where they are not. For where we cannot define, we ought at least to be able to find the limits between which the truth must lie; to be able to say that this at least, and that, are wrong—as, for example, in the case of usury or capitalism. We can agree, perhaps, that men are not irresponsible for the uses to which they voluntarily lend their money; that they have not a "right" to raise whatever dividends they can, without respect to the good either of employees or consumers; that it is criminal to spend beyond a certain proportion of a high income for one's own pleasure—and so on. If these are truths they are worth preaching, even though a wide area still remains for doubt—such as the whole justification of the economic and class system in which we live.

And as it is with this question, so it is with others. If we are allowed to suppose for a moment that contraception is not simply to be forbidden, can the field of tolerable disagreement about it be defined, so that some uses could be ruled out by consent? Can we say that it is simply immoral for healthy persons to marry with the intention of having no children or less than some desirable number? Can we define within any limits (or wholly prohibit) the

beginning of marriage with a period of voluntary sterility for the sake of pleasure and convenience? Can we define the legitimate weight of the economic factor? What standard of life is it right (if ever right) to preserve at the cost of family limitation below a certain number? When is a danger to health really a danger? Are wives with professions in a peculiar position? And so on.

Over these burning questions we are inclined to behave as puritan opinion does over proposals to tax or regularize betting. To do so, they say, would be to approve what you leave unrepressed and to legitimate that from which you profit. And therefore, since you cannot in fact dissuade people from this diversion, the best thing you can do is to put your head in the sand and refuse to recognize what exists. So with capitalism, or contraception, or anything else that is felt to be a trifle shady. And so we leave the public with the idea that we have a personal distaste for the *bête noire*, but are not seriously prepared to press this. No effect is produced: how could it be? If the consciences of other men are less beautifully adjusted than ours, we can but appeal to the moral reason they have, to recognize manifest abuses; and it is difficult to see how else one is to begin their further education, or set them on the road which may lead them to appreciate at last the damnable impiety of wagering a sixpence—if that is the noble pitch to which we hope to raise them.

The alternative policy would be to lay down clear rulings of wide generality and apparent severity, and then grant dispensations according to a certain list of exemptions. There seems little to be said for this. If we have not got consent of the Church that this or that is wrong in principle, we cannot make the definition. If we have, the exemptions must be exceptional and few, or the rule is overthrown. And such a plan presupposes a different relation between clergy and people than in fact exists for the most part among us. We are committed, for good or ill, to proceed more by education of the conscience of the congregation than by the exercise of authoritative direction privately and in detail.

But in spite of this, our moral theologian has no need to give up in despair on every question to which he cannot answer "Yes" or "No" in the form in which it is asked. He can aim at definition within limits. And we have no need to give the impression that what we cannot yet define

with common consent of the Church is actually a matter of indifference. Nor shall we give that impression, if we constantly set moral rule in the context where it belongs—the context of whole-hearted service to God. There is no state of mind more deplorable than that of the man who scrupulously observes rule and religiously avails himself of dispensation, and thinks of his duty in terms of how much indulgence is permitted, not how God may best be served and his neighbour's good promoted. But this attitude needs only to be described to be abhorred by any healthy mind. Moral rule must be taught as a definition of the bounds within which man's one great purpose can be achieved—the glory of God. Which is merely to universalize the maxim—the Sabbath was made for man: man was not made for the Sabbath.

This brings us back to the point from which we started—the wholeness of theology. Moral rulings are not offered to men who disbelieve the substance of the creed: they are presented to faith, not to fear. It is often true that, as the old Protestants liked to say, you must awe men with the law before you can gladden them with the gospel: the first appeal of religion is to the conscience. Nevertheless this is a transitory phase. It is only in those that walk " not according to the flesh, but the spirit " that " the ordinance of the law is fulfilled."

AUSTIN FARRER.

The Sermons of a Country Parson: James Woodforde in his Pulpit.—II

THE ecclesiastical tradition inherited and observed by Parson Woodforde was admittedly simple and inelaborate. It embraced the performance of divine service with sermon once each Sunday at Weston, alternately in the morning and afternoon, together with a quarterly Sacrament, the reading of prayers on Good Friday, and the administration of baptism, marriage, the burial of the dead, and the visitation of the sick, as need occasioned. During his curacy in Somerset there is some evidence in his diary of the observance of holy days, but none during his protracted incumbency at Weston. There is abundant evidence of his diligence in baptizing the children of his parish, and of his zeal in visiting the sick and afflicted, ministering to both

their spiritual and temporal needs. Moreover, the frequent and spontaneous ejaculations of pious aspiration, which mark in his diaries the record of events, domestic and parochial, testify to his sincere faith. Judged by the selective evidence of the published extracts from his diaries, James Woodforde was a man of simple religious belief and a genuine pastoral zeal for the welfare of his people. If the different tradition of our own age makes difficult the sympathetic understanding of his practice, we may be assured that his judgment on ourselves would be equally strange and disconcerting.

Since public worship at Weston was restricted almost entirely to Sundays, it may be useful to consider Woodforde's teaching concerning the obligation and nature of Christian worship on Sunday. Sermon No. 88, on the famous text from St Mark ii, 27-8, " The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath; therefore the Son of Man is lord also of the sabbath," was preached thrice at Castle Cary between 1766 and 1770, and four times at Weston in 1776, 1781, 1785, and 1788. Its theme was the argument from the account of Creation for the necessity of a Sabbath day, in which men should withdraw from secular affairs and devote themselves to the contemplation of spiritual things. Originally, Woodforde believed, this was a universal practice of the human race, and afterwards became especially binding upon the Jewish people by positive command of God for the ends of rest and worship. In reply to the question " for what reasons and with what designs the Supreme Being was pleased to institute the observance of the Sabbath day," the preacher affirmed that " the immediate design of this institution was that the seventh day should be chiefly applied to holy and religious uses." He argued that some fixed and regular time for the cultivation of spiritual things was necessary, so that " the sabbath was made for man in mercy to him, to bring him often to the true fountain of all his joys." The Jewish regulations concerning the Sabbath had become very complex and onerous, and Woodforde allowed that Christ had relaxed them so " that works of necessity and charity are lawful on that day." The Christian observance of Sunday consisted therefore " in abstaining from bodily labour and worldly cares, and in dedicating the greatest part of this day to public and private acts of piety and devotion." Worship was the primary object and duty; and especially " to humble ourselves before God

in secret addresses to the throne of grace, and to rejoice in assembling together in His house to unite in public praises and thanksgivings." Since, however, the provision for public worship at Weston was limited to one service on Sunday, and since evening services were not yet customary in the Church of England, there remained the practical question how the greater part of the day should be employed. In Woodforde's opinion " as the mind cannot always be intent even on these duties, but must have its relaxations in their turn, we must likewise take care that the relaxations we use after the discharge of them be such only as are in themselves innocent "; so that " some innocent amusements may be justly allowed " but not such games as " tend to inflame the passions and corrupt the mind. "

Exhortations to regular attendance upon the public worship of God are interspersed throughout other of Woodforde's parochial sermons. In Sermon No. 146, from the text John xiii, 17, " If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them," preached thrice in Somerset and five times at Weston between 1778 and 1794, he inveighed against the readiness of Christians to neglect this duty. " A party of pleasure, the dropping in of a friend, a too luxurious meal, an indolence of disposition, in a word anything or nothing is deemed a sufficient excuse for our staying from church and neglecting the public worship of our Maker." In Sermon No. 187, on the text Psalm l, 14, " Offer unto God thanksgiving, and pay thy vows unto the most Highest," delivered only in Norfolk, in 1782, twice in 1787, and in 1796, Woodforde presented a *rationale* of worship. It was grounded in natural reason, since the duty of worship " considered absolutely in itself is the debt and law of our nature," and since reason " cannot, if it does its office at all, but apprehend God, as the best and most perfect Being." Here reason was joined by " that strong bent towards gratitude which the Author of our nature hath implanted in it," since God Himself is (in typical eighteenth-century phrase) " the great and universal benefactor." The conclusion must be admitted therefore that " it is the voice of Nature, as far as gratitude itself is so, that the good things we receive from above, should be sent back thither in praises and thanksgivings." From this foundation Woodforde proceeded to enumerate three " peculiar properties and advantages of this duty which recommend it to the devout performer." First, it is " the most pleasing

part of our devotions; it proceeds always from a lively and cheerful temper of mind, and it cherishes as well as improves what it proceeds from." Secondly, " it enlargeth the powers and capacities of our souls, turning them from little and low things to their greatest and noblest objects, the divine nature "; and in so doing " it stretches our faculties upon their full stretch, and improves them to all the degrees of perfection of which they are capable." Thirdly, " it will work in us a deep humility and consciousness of our own imperfections." The preacher concluded with a warning against the " very high degree of guilt and folly " in neglecting this duty; and " as to those who continually live in the contempt of this great duty, very few words may suffice; for if they are bold enough to slight a duty of this rank and character, they will easily slight everything that can be offered to persuade them to it." This sermon, like most of those composed during the preacher's later years, is much shorter than his earlier compositions.

Amongst the most interesting of the forty sermons of Woodforde are those in which he explained the nature and practice of Christian prayer. Two sermons particularly set forth the Christian obligation to public and private prayer, Nos. 142 and 143. They were preached interchangeably from two texts: James v, 16, " The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much;" and Proverbs xv, 8, " The prayer of the upright is his delight." The former was delivered twice in Somerset, in 1769 and 1771, and four times in Norfolk, in 1778, 1780, 1783, and 1788; and the latter twice in Somerset, and only thrice at Weston, in 1778, 1783, and 1788. Upon each of these occasions save in 1780, the two sermons were associated in delivery, and appear to have been preached on successive Sundays. They may be taken therefore as representative of the pastoral preaching of their writer upon this vital matter of religious devotion.

The first sermon defined prayer as " a solemn act of worshipping of the Supreme Being, wherein we on the one hand acknowledge our weakness and indigence, on the other His power and ability to afford us relief"; and referred to the recognition of this duty on the part of the heathen. To Christians five reasons could be offered for its practice: Man as a creature is dependent on his Creator; as subject to sin, he needs deliverance and grace; as liable to misery and ill, he needs relief and succour; as the subject of deliver-

ance he owes praise and thanksgiving; and as a member of the human race he should pray for his neighbour and for all mankind. " If it is reasonable that the creature should acknowledge his dependence on the Creator; that those who stand in need of many good, and in fear of many evil, things, should petition for the obtaining of the one and preventing of the other; if it is reasonable to return thanks for benefits received and evils prevented; and to love our brethren; then it is in all these respects highly reasonable that we should discharge the duty of prayer to almighty God." Woodforde observed that, of course, our prayers " are not intended to give any information to God which He before had not," but to bring us to a consciousness of dependence upon Him. To this end definite and regular practice of prayer was essential. " When the thoughts which we entertain upon a survey of our sins and necessities so far influence us as to incline us to prayer, when we bring them forth before the Most High, clothed in proper expressions and attended with suitable gestures, they are thereby most deeply imprinted on our minds; and by a steady and uniform performance of this duty are at last fixed in such strong colours as never to be discharged; whereas had they never issued from the closet of our hearts, they might have been strangled in the birth, or proved the children but of a melancholy moment." From these considerations it followed that if " little indeed can be offered for those who object to the mysteries of our most holy religion, less can be said for those who object to the duties of it. The former, though not against, are yet much above our reason; but the latter lie exactly level to our understandings, and are not less strongly recommended by reason than by revelation."

Having thus established the reasonableness of prayer, the second sermon was devoted " to show the qualifications requisite to make our prayers acceptable to God, and likewise to mention those advantages which we may reasonably expect from a due discharge of that duty." An indispensable prerequisite was a right temper on the part of men in approaching prayer, since it was not sufficient simply to be " regular and constant in saying over a few prayers, without either rectifying the temper of their minds or altering the method of their lives." First, Woodforde emphasized sincerity. " Sincerity is the life of prayer; it is that which makes it an act of true devotion, and of high price in the

sight of God; and this virtue we may be sure to have in good degree when we endeavour to purify our minds from all iniquity and ask nothing but with a good and upright intention." Secondly, he insisted upon humility; a virtue which " naturally arises from the duty itself, the performance of which supposes want in us who ask and power in Him of whom we ask, dependence on our part and sovereignty on God's." With the sense of need would go that of unworthiness, and the humility of the heart would " naturally produce that of the body, or a grave and reverend deportment in our devotions, expressive of the low opinion which we have of ourselves and of the high one which we entertain of almighty God." Thirdly, attention must be cultivated; and its cultivation would not be so easy as some might imagine. The preacher accordingly enlarged upon the need to develop concentration of mind and to banish wandering and intrusive thoughts. " Nor will the Author of our nature require more of us than our nature will enable us to perform, but will look upon our infirmities with an eye of pity and compassion, and extend His grace and pardon to them." If attention could be secured, fervency must be added, since it is " the effectual *fervent* prayer which availeth much." But fervour was to a considerable degree a matter of temperament. " Those therefore should not be cast down who feel not these holy raptures in such a degree as others seem to do; nor should those of a more sanguine complexion be over and above measure elated when they feel these transports, and blasphemously fancy that they are, in the language of a modern enthusiast, sensibly actuated by the Holy Ghost." Therefore though fervency is " a very necessary and happy qualification of prayer," great caution should be exercised " that this fervency be such as is required by God, that is, it should be a gentle, pleasing, heavenly flame, and not a headstrong and outrageous fire, which hurries men into enthusiasm." Furthermore, perseverance was essential in prayer, so that it might be, not intermittent and evoked by some sudden calamity or stirring of the conscience, but regular, persistent, and refusing to be discouraged by apparent lack of direct answer. Finally, " to the above-mentioned qualifications of an acceptable prayer, we must add a lively faith in Christ," such a faith " as doth not overthrow good works but produceth them." The sermon concluded by a survey of the advantages of prayer, arguing that since pleasure, honour, and profit

were the " three great idols of the modern world," prayer satisfied the demand for them in their deepest sense. For prayer was the pleasure of the soul; it brought the honour of friendship with the King of kings, and the profit of temporal prosperity and eternal felicity.

The quarterly Sacrament of the eighteenth-century Church was by no means, as the examples of Dr Johnson and the Duke of Newcastle, the " ecclesiastical minister " of George II, sufficiently demonstrate, an evidence of disesteem of that ordinance. James Woodforde's surviving sermons fortunately embrace one on the Holy Sacrament, No. 97, from the text in Luke xxii, 19, " This do in remembrance of Me," preached at Ansford and Castle Cary on October 4 and 11, 1767, and thrice at Weston, in September, 1777, May, 1786, and June, 1794. It was designed to set forth three points concerning the Holy Communion: first, " the obligation that lies upon all Christians to communicate in it, and that as frequently as opportunity offers "; secondly, " the benefits and advantages that accrue to us from so doing "; and thirdly, " the little or no weight that there is in the common pretences which usually keep people from this frequent communicating." The first point was easily demonstrated from the command of Christ, which established reception as " a necessary and perpetual duty incumbent on all Christians," and made it " the distinguishing badge of our profession," as " an act of worship that our Lord hath ordained to witness to all the world that we are His disciples and that we own Him to be our Lord and Master." The benefits of reception were " truly great, and, I may say, invaluable "; and Woodforde expounded them in a passage of sufficient interest to be quoted in full.

" The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is the great and solemn means that Christ hath appointed in His Church to all Christians for the obtaining of pardon and forgiveness of their sins committed since their baptism. As the sacrament of baptism was instituted by Christ for the entering men into covenant with God, so this other sacrament of His Supper was instituted for the renewing that covenant with God, by which means a conveyance is made of all the benefits of Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. It was called by the antients the Christian sacrifice; not that we pretend in our communions to offer up the real body and blood of Christ in sacrifice to God (as the church of Rome does), for that—as the apostle tells us—was done once by Himself upon the cross and by that offering He hath for ever perfected all them that are sanctified; so that there is no need of any

such offering any more; but we commemorate that sacrifice which Christ has made for us; by doing which we may be truly said to offer a sacrifice unto God."

The preacher continued to argue the need of sacraments upon the usual lines that man is an incarnate spirit, needing the clothing of spiritual grace in material forms. Notwithstanding these considerations, and the express command of Jesus, " there are some such fatal prejudices that men have too often taken up in regard to this sacrament that almost all discourses of this nature are generally ineffectual." Of these, the two chief were " the general sense that men have of their own unfitness to receive it, and the infinite danger they run, if they should receive it unworthily "; and the rest of the sermon set itself the duty of removing these objections. The former was met by the counter-argument that unworthiness should lead rather to frequent communion, " for that is the means to make us better; it is the most effectual method we can take to promote virtue and piety in ourselves." What is required of the communicant is not perfection, but penitence and faith.

The danger of unworthy reception was more difficult to answer; and there is abundance of contemporary evidence to show that it was deeply and seriously felt by eighteenth-century churchmen. Woodforde accordingly sought to explain the true meaning of St Paul's ominous words upon this matter. " The unworthy receiving that St Paul so severely censures among the Corinthians was upon account of their approaching the Lord's Table with so little a sense of what they were about that they did not discern the Lord's Body: that is, they made no distinction between the bread of the Sacrament and common bread." Upon them the apostle pronounced condemnation. But " the damnation here mentioned is not, cannot be there, eternal damnation. If we consult the original, it will amount to no more than this: ' He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.' . . . But here is not a word of eternal damnation, much less of any man's being concluded in that state by receiving unworthily; unless any one will presume to say that all those who are visited by God's judgments in this world, shall be condemned in the next." The fear of the penalty attaching to unworthy reception, though widespread, need be no deterrent from communicating. " To conclude therefore, let the sin of coming to the

Sacrament unworthily be as great as we can reasonably suppose, the sin of totally withdrawing from it is greater. The truth of this assertion will appear from this known rule in divinity: ' that it is a greater sin to omit a known duty altogether than to perform that duty as well as we can, though with much unworthiness.' "

The remaining pastoral sermons of Woodforde embrace a wide variety of subjects of common interest to his own and other ages, which must be passed by without specification. One discourse, however, warning his flock against the contemporary bugbear of " enthusiasm," should not be omitted from any eighteenth-century survey. This sermon, No. 154, on the text from 2 Corinthians v, 13: " For whether we be beside ourselves, it is to God; or whether we be sober, it is for your cause," was preached twice in Somerset, in 1770 and 1772, and four times at Weston, in 1777, 1781, 1786, and 1794. The references to Methodists in the published diaries are comparatively few and benevolently neutral in tone. In this sermon Woodforde observed that " there have been many instances in the world of such enthusiasm as is really a religious phrensy, by which men have been led into the greatest and wildest extravagancies; when reason seems to have been in a great measure lost, and a furious, unbridled imagination hath carried all before it. There is not perhaps any point in which our pains can be better bestowed, than in learning how to distinguish between an enthusiastic spirit and that warmth and those ardours of holy affection, that fervour and intention of the powers in matters of religion, which have their foundation in reason and truth, and which are perfectly according to right nature."

At the outset, he defined enthusiasm as " a man's acting under an apprehension of a present divine energy upon his mind to which all his powers are supposed to be subject, and by which he is carried on without attention to anything else as his guide." Examples of such an attitude were found in pagan antiquity, and in the Old Testament, as, for example, in the phrensy of the prophets of Baal against Elijah. " Some modern instances also there have been of enthusiasm, even in the Christian world, where persons have thought themselves inspired, and where the ecstasies they have been in have been attended with such strange convulsions and agitations of body as were not only ridiculous but quite unnatural." The criterion by which such mani-

festations were to be judged was the evident fact " that the rational powers have little or nothing to do with them; no enquiry, no calm deliberation, no comparing things with the maxims of reason, or first principles of religion, so as to form a rational judgment, but the mind carried vehemently along, giving way to what is thought to be a divine energy." It was true that " enthusiasm " was a perversion of the principle " of a divine agency upon the minds of men," of which abundant evidence was to be found in Scripture, by predictive prophecy, by " signs," and by instances of immediate revelations. But such extraordinary means were no longer necessary. " We have now no reason to expect such extraordinary revelations; but we have still reason to expect and must still depend upon the assistance of the Spirit of God in an ordinary way, that is, by countenancing and aiding us in the use of the powers which He hath given us, which undoubtedly He can strengthen." Such assistance could be recognized by remembering " that the Spirit of God worketh upon the minds of men by means of their rational powers, and not without them." Having differentiated thus the extraordinary and ordinary operations of the Spirit, the preacher concluded with a warning against such a reaction from " enthusiasm " as would induce " a culpable languor and insensibility of spirit in matters of religion," and with an appeal for " warmth of affection and fervour of spirit in religion " which were " not only rational, natural, and manly, but may be said to be the necessary concomitants of a lively faith."

The incomparable story of Joseph and his brethren has been a favourite theme of preachers in all generations; and an illustration of Woodforde's narrative style when applied to a dramatic subject may be gathered from Sermon No. 119, on the text from Genesis xlv, 4: " And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near unto me, I pray you ; and they came near; and he said, I am Joseph, your brother, whom ye sold into Egypt "; preached twice in Somerset, in 1768 and 1771, and five times in Norfolk, twice in 1778, in 1782, 1786, and 1793. When Reuben opposed the wish of his brethren to kill Joseph, the preacher imagined him to address them as follows:

" O good God, how am I astonished at the horror of your resolution. For the sake of heaven, before your hands are imbrued with the blood of innocence, a brother's blood, consider, what is the life you are about to take away? A life derived

from the same fountain with your own, fed from the same breast, and cherished by the same affection. But this is not all. You will plunge your impious daggers in the author of your being. You will kill your venerable father."

Similar soliloquies were inserted to mark the return of Reuben to find Joseph stolen away, and the report of Joseph's death to Jacob, with a caution " against a common error concerning the ways of God to man," namely that God contrived all the circumstances of Joseph's misfortunes; " on which I shall observe in one word, that God cannot be the author of evil, but that to bring good out of evil is consistent both with His gracious disposition and with His moral government of the world." The sermon reached its climax with the coming of Joseph into the presence of his brethren in Egypt:

" perhaps with some such soliloquy as this: ' O great God of Jacob, what a scene hast Thou brought before me! My eyes have again beheld my brethren, strangers to me more than twenty years. Dear, unhappy men! indeed, my heart forgives you. How do I long to discover myself to you, but that you would die with shame at the sight of your injured brother. None of you could rejoice at such a discovery, save Benjamin; he, amiable innocence, he entered not into your horrid conspiracy! But I must think of some means to free you from the disagreeable impressions of shame, when I make myself known to you; and endeavour to heighten your joy on that occasion by first alarming your fears.' Such probably was the generous design of Joseph in his scheme for retaining Benjamin."

In attempting any estimate of the evidential value of these sermons of James Woodforde, their paucity in number must be remembered. They total only forty, of which sixteen belonged to the later years of his Norfolk incumbency; and they were preached there 141 times in all. Woodforde was vicar of Weston from 1776 to 1802, and they represent therefore less than three years' of this quarter-of-a-century's preaching. In such circumstances the danger of argument from silence must be constantly borne in mind. It does not follow that topics excluded from these sermons were banished from his pulpit. Notwithstanding, it may be affirmed at once that a perusal of these two score discourses presents an aspect of the author's character very different from the devotee of the table and of card-games depicted in the published diaries. Many questions arise which cannot be answered. Thus it would be of great

interest to know how far the diarist's practice of private prayer corresponded with his public precept. The sermons, however, illustrate faithfully in many points, both of thought and style, contemporary interests in religion. They would be too long for present-day congregations. Perhaps in their own day they belonged to those Anglican sermons of which Dr Johnson complained that they " flew over the heads of the common people without any impression on their hearts." Certainly their rustic hearers at Castle Cary and Weston must have found them difficult to follow. Probably in their interests and composition they were typical of many eighteenth-century sermons. They presented a tradition of churchmanship which would have found both the Evangelical revival and the Tractarian movement uncongenial. But fashions change in churchmanship and sermons; and James Woodforde, judged by the evidence of these surviving discourses, represented the dominant churchmanship of his age, simple and homespun alike in its theology and worship, innocent of any system of dogmatic theology or of any liturgical knowledge, yet of a sincere and simple pastoral piety, which by its very strangeness may serve to remind us of the standards of Anglicanism in a bygone day.

N. Sykes.

Sensuality and Substance

" For I saw full assuredly," wrote the Lady Julian, " that our Substance is in God, and also I saw that in our sensualite God is; for in the self point that our Soul is made sensual, in the self point is the City of God ordained to Him from without beginning; into which seat He cometh and never shall remove it . . . and as anent our substance and sensualite it may rightly be cleped our soul: and that is because of the oneing that they have in God. The worshipful City that our Lord Jesus sitteth in is our sensualite, in which He is enclosed: and our kindly Substance is enclosed in Jesus with the blessed Soul of Christ sitting in rest in the Godhead."

Whatever the Lady Julian meant by " sensualite," she certainly meant nothing less material or less vital than the whole physical nature; she was not weakening or refining it away. She followed the Church, which, ever

since it had rejected the Nestorian idea of a merely moral union of the two natures in Christ, had been committed to a realistic sense of the importance of matter: "our soul with our body, and our body with our soul, either of them taking help of other," which is not Browning but the Lady Julian again. The operations of matter are a means of the operation of Christ, and the body has not, in fact, as some pious people suggest, fallen a good deal further than the soul.

This is all elementary enough; it is implicit or explicit in all the rites and all the rituals. It remains, however, that the help which the body gives to the soul has been far less seriously examined than the help which the soul gives to the body. The dichotomy which orthodoxy turned out of its official dogma has continually returned in its unofficial language; the result was epigrammatized in the question of Patmore's daughter: "Father, isn't marriage rather a wicked sacrament?" The Way of the Rejection of Images has been far more considered throughout Christendom than the Way of the Affirmation of Images—unless, indeed, those images were of the accepted religious kind. Yet the two ways have the same maxim and the same aim—"to love everything because God loves it." This is their union, and, this laid down, one way is not superior to the other, nor perhaps more difficult.

The result of our unofficial Manicheism has been that when the official representatives of the Church have talked about such things as sexual love (to take one example), they may have said the right things, but they have said very few of them and they have generally said them in the wrong style. The great world and energy of the body have been either deprecated or devotionalized; and by devotionalized I mean turned into a pale imitation of "substance," of spirit; thus losing their own powers and privileges without, in general, gaining any others. There has been a wide feeling that the more like an indeterminate soul the body can be made the better. But the *Anthropos* in Christ was not "like" the *Theos*: it was like nothing but itself. So the body is not "like" the soul; it is like nothing but itself. The principle of our sensuality is unique and divine. It is, no doubt, rooted in substance. "Soul is form and doth the body make" is a fine Platonist line. But soul ought not to be allowed to reduce the body to its own shadow—at any rate, in the Christian Church.

The result of this shy spiritualism has been, of course, to leave the Church particularly open to attack, or rather to leave its general public particularly open to attack. The Church owes more to heretics than she is ever likely (on this earth) to admit; her gratitude is always slightly patronizing. There existed, in the early part of the twentieth century, a convinced and rhetorical heretic named David Herbert Lawrence. Of what exactly he was convinced it is not always easy to be sure, except on the very broadest lines. He thought that sex was important; he thought physical nature significant; he thought modern industrialism disgusting; he thought men needed leaders—or a leader; he thought also that each man must find out his own foundations, leader or no leader. His style as a leader was much more like Luther or Wesley than Calvin or Aquinas. But on quite a number of occasions he knew how to use words, and he produced for some time a very great effect on sections of the general public. This was accentuated by the suppression of some of his books and pictures by the State, which excited a number of the young to something like a sexual frenzy on Lawrence's behalf, and also cordially interested on his behalf a number of the more mature.

When Lawrence died, at the age of forty-five, in 1930, a number of books were written about him by his friends. This fortune, good or bad, he shared with others. Men and women who had known him wrote about him and about themselves; quite properly, for the only way in which they could explain his effect on them was by writing about themselves. But his capacity and effect as a writer were there subordinated to his personality. That some of the books which appeared should seem to deal too much with the difficulties and disputes between his friends was inevitable; a little spite could not be kept out and a little superiority was eagerly invited in. These things fade; the really interesting question is whether and to what extent Lawrence will fade. Even now, that seems almost impossible to anyone who remembers the thunder of the captains and the shouting; the first reading of the full version of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, its moving beauty, its increasing repetitions; or the half-jest, half-assent with which one heard of the " dark gods "—dimly recollecting at the same time the fiery darkness of Boehme or the monstrous fables of the alchemical design.

He convinced only partly by his own language, and partly

by his readers' memories—by that and by the sense of the blood, by that and by the sense of poetry. He could not be regarded as a serious poet, though he wrote some good poems. But he had a power to arouse, without any specially memorable phrase, a chaotic sense of poetic images. These certainly could not be even partially analysed; they were of the same kind as those in Blake's Prophetic Books—gigantic and cloudy, unlike the mighty but lucid powers of Milton. And this was accentuated by the tendency of his confused mind to denounce, on behalf of the blood, the graces of intelligence, the holy intellect itself. It is not surprising that he should dislike all that he could understand of Jane Austen, but that he should prefer the "blood-stream" in Defoe or Fielding, because there was more "character" in them and less "personality"—this is a little odd. He thought, no doubt, he was protesting again, in literature, against the weakening of the style, but it was not so; only the richness of Jane Austen did not have to shout its sensuality aloud.

He was greatly moved also by the notion of authority. It seems sometimes that he was chiefly moved by the notion that he was himself authority—and yet he fled from that as much as he turned to it. To judge by his Letters, it was the war of 1914-18 which drove him into an antagonism to his kind, and provoked (as it very naturally might) a sense of separation and therefore—in him—of superiority. Against that sense of superiority, nevertheless, he was always reacting, partly from fear, partly from intelligence, partly from (what is the same thing) humility. He knew that authority comes into action only by "a dark unfathomable free submission." Of that kind of submission he saw no sign in the world around him—neither in the mining-village of his birth, nor in the scholastic world of his teaching days, nor in the intellectual circles of his later life. "Grace does not come through liberty, but liberty through grace," Calvin quoted from Augustine, and Lawrence might have quoted it from either, had he been fortunate enough to know either. He felt that great truth by nature, but he could not find its vocabulary. He felt desperately the cheapening all round him of words, of sex, of life. And he conceived (like the Church) that the redemption lay in something other than morals—however important morals might be, and he was not one to cheapen them. At the end of *Aaron's Rod*, after pages of discussion,

he wrote a few sentences which achieve their effect partly by being *there*—at the end:

" There was a long pause. Then Aaron looked up into Lilly's face. It was dark and remote-seeming. It was like a Byzantine eikon at the moment.

" ' And whom shall I submit to ?' he said.

" ' Your soul will tell you,' replied the other."

He stopped—most fortunately—there. He could not always stop; he was unlike a Byzantine eikon in that. An insensitiveness to his medium sometimes accompanied his ill-defined gospel; the two inadequacies are related. He would—and did—break off the story of a perfectly good dinner-party to go off, like Thackeray, into a long disquisition. But unlike Thackeray, he has not both his methods on one level, so that the reader is made almost physically ill by the jerk. It is not altogether a matter of his too-often irritated language, for his irritation produced at times the most healthy comments. Few sentences can be more urgently recommended to many Christian writers than: " You want to whoosh off in a nice little love-whoosh and lose yourself." God, it has been said, loves Himself as the Good and not as Himself, and love must in general be an act of the will. But Lawrence was aware, in those around him, of love as a poor emotionalism, and of the will as a dry sectarian thing. He fled from such sterilities and liquidities to the power from which they seemed to have been abstracted, to the depths of " sensualite " and the æonian process of the blood.

Mr Hugh Kingsmill's study[1] of him is a biography, and carefully not much more than a biography. It ought to serve that purpose for some years, for it must be practically the only book on Lawrence uncoloured by personal acquaintance or intellectual approval or disapproval of its subject's varied views. Mr Kingsmill has his views, of course, but he tries not to press them unduly and he subdues the natural amusement or unhappiness which some of Lawrence's relations with his acquaintances provoke. " They filch my life for a sensation to themselves," he said in one of his letters, and it was not altogether untrue; their books show it. But it may be added on their side that it was precisely sensation which he offered them and which he professed to be valid. " The phallic consciousness," he wrote, " is

[1] *D. H. Lawrence*, by Hugh Kingsmill. Methuen, 10s. 6d.

not the cerebral sex-consciousness, but something really deeper, and the root of poetry, lived or sung." Certainly a cerebral sex-consciousness is not likely to be the root of much poetry, but then neither is the phallic consciousness unless some kind of cerebralism assists it. Dante asserts that when he first saw Beatrice the spirits of his sensations, of his emotions, and of his intellect were all stirred at once. The first exclaimed: "Ah wretch! how often I shall be hampered henceforth!"; the second: "Behold a god mightier than I who is come to rule over me!"; the third: "Now your beatitude has appeared." Dante spent a good deal of the rest of his life finding out what exactly they meant. But much as Dante may rebuke Lawrence, he is no less of a rebuke to those who attempt to annex poetry ("lived or sung"—whatever that means) to a spiritualism of sensibility. Poetry is sensual and intellectual—like sex. Both have, as Wordsworth said, "a strength of usurpation," and Wordsworth went on to say that in that usurpation

> "When the light of sense
> Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
> The invisible world, doth greatness make abode,
> There harbours."

It is the vast union of visible and invisible, tangible and intangible, which is the real business of exploration—anyhow for Christians. The Christians of Lawrence's day did not care for the exploration of the body; he reacted against them with a natural but undesirable violence. Mr Ford Madox Ford has said: "Lawrence had the misfortune to become conscious of life in London and in a class in London that by a sort of inverted Puritanism insisted that a sort of nebulous glooming about sex was a moral duty and a sort of heroism." But the Christians had driven them to it by a kind of nebulous gilding of sex and the body; they had refined the body into an unreal phantom of dim light and called it the Resurrection. Their morals aimed at a docetic Christ, and the awful creeds recalled them in vain.

Mr Kingsmill's enjoyable book should be accompanied by Mr Aldous Huxley's Introduction to the Letters, for that presents convincingly the effect of Lawrence's personality on his friends—in a way that others (say Mabel Dodge's *Lorenzo in Taos*) do not. Mr Huxley quotes Vernon Lee as saying: "He sees more than a human being ought to see," and he adds, "To be with him was to find oneself transported

to one of the frontiers of human consciousness." He goes on to say: " He could cook, he could sew, he could darn a stocking and milk a cow, he was an efficient wood-cutter and a good hand at embroidery, fires always burned when he laid them and a floor, after Lawrence had scrubbed it, was thoroughly clean." Mr Kingsmill tells the story of his crying out, in a car which had broken down, and of the mechanics of which he knew nothing: " I am a failure ! I am a failure as a man in a world of men !" Obviously, it was not true. He was a man, he was a writer, he might have been a leader—had he had any idea of precisely where to lead or exactly how, had he heard of the way of Affirmation of Images.

Of that way he was inevitably ignorant. Nor, it seems, did he find any satisfactory other. As a prophet, therefore, he was something of a failure, but, to do him justice, it was a rôle which he never desired. Unfortunately, the imposed vocation interfered with another authority which he did half-acknowledge, the authority of the English language. He could do things with it, he did them too rarely. He did create a few human emotions; he occasionally achieved something almost non-human. The end of *The Woman who Rode Away* invokes a strange unworldly landscape and action—except for the last sentence or two when some merely silly remark walks solemnly in. He did it in *Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent*—the edge of an inhuman greatness rises on the horizon, and he attempts violently to invoke it, or he reproves us for not knowing it—and it is gone at once. The short stories have sometimes a human, sometimes an inhuman, effect. He tried occasionally the modern style of having no particular effect at all—a thing which lesser people did better.

The same difficulty, the same uncertainty, hover over his efforts at more familiar things. He knew about the world of *Sons and Lovers*, but neither he nor his readers know about the monotonously boring world of " passion " (passion !) in *The Trespassers*. But perhaps he never came nearer to the actuality of what he thought he was writing about and wanted to write about than in a sentence in *The White Peacock*: " The soft outstretching of her hand was like the whispering of strange words into the blood, and as she fingered a book the heart watched silently for the meaning." The wonder, the intense awareness of *meaning*, in such a hand, or in any other such member of the physical body, the moment

of great expectation of great wisdom, was the moment he greatly desired to explore. He believed that there was meaning, and his sincerity was in that unresting desire. He wandered round the world seeking it; he blamed Europe, and Asia, and America, for not giving it to him. "Yet I don't believe in Buddha—hate him in fact—his rat-hole temples and his rat-hole religion. Better Jesus." The phrase was more accurate than he, ignorant of Christianity, knew. But for reasons the disciples of Jesus whom he did know were incapable of explaining. They had not attended to the Athanasian Creed. Yet that great Ode contains in itself much that Lawrence might have recognized. It does not insist, as he sometimes did, that one must be *oneself*, that one must be *alone*. With probably a greater justice than his, it may be supposed to assume that most people, somehow or other, discover that they are alone all too painfully, and as for being oneself. . . . But it does insist precisely on what he was always emphasizing: that the life of "sensuality" and the life of "substance" cannot be separated and must not be confused.

"For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man; so God and Man is one Christ.

"One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God.

"One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person."

If this is so, we may have to recover for all that creation the Way of the Affirmation of its Images. We shall take no harm from it; we need not be morally nervous; its difficulties are no more, though certainly no less, than the difficulties of the Way of the Rejection of Images which, on the whole, the Christian notabilities have so far preferred. The movements for housing and social reform, the consciousness of the dispossessed masses, have already prepared the way as an accident of their own preoccupation. There is no likelihood that we shall become more amorously promiscuous because the other preoccupation is heartened by the physical intellect, because we have more meaning to brood over. The great identity of the *Anthropos* will be preserved the better in the categories of substance and sensuality the more we attend to those categories as such. The *New Life* of Dante does not begin to talk *only* of the spirit; no, that young and great doctor faints at the sight of his beloved; he cries when she cuts him; he is like any hysterical adoles-

cent—that is, like anyone much in love. And the great surge of passion that immortally follows is precisely not a passion in which sensuality is refined away; at the close of the *Purgatory* she says to him: "You should have been faithful to my buried flesh," *mia carne sepolta*, and in her actual eyes he sees reflected the two-natured Gryphon of Christ. There is no intenser image of the whole business of Romantic Theology—if it may so be called, meaning by the words that kind of theology which devotes itself to the serious study of the great romantic moment such as Dante and Wordsworth knew (in their separate kinds). It is Dante's image of "the self point of union" where is the City; it is the flash of the sudden usurpation of flesh which reveals the greatness of the invisible City.

The wonder, the thrill, of a shoulder or a hand awaits its proper exploration. At present we have simply nothing to say to anyone in a state of exaltation, watching for "meaning," except something which sounds very much like: "Well, don't look too intently." The hungry sheep look up for metaphysics, the profound metaphysics of the awful and redeeming body, and are given morals. Yet they are encouraged to receive the Blessed Sacrament which is defined to be for the body and the soul. Lawrence was a heretic—good; but he was concerned with a Christian orthodoxy—the orthodoxy of the blood of Man.

How to discover that? God knows; it cannot be done in study circles. We might certainly consider what has been done—there is the Lady Julian, there is Dante, there are Donne and Patmore. There is Lawrence. It is urgent that we should do it; it is even more urgent that we should not be ingenious and that we should take care of our style. Lawrence asserted that "we shall never free the phallic reality from its 'uplift' taint till we give it its own phallic language and use the obscene words." He was certainly wrong, but he was no more wrong than those who habitually use a vocabulary which completely consists of uplift. For the result of that kind of evasion of "sensuality" is the destruction of "substance." The only "uplift" permissible is that of the Ascension, and it was a real body (the very root of all sensuality) which there withdrew through all the dimensions. "Handle me and see——" Repulsive materialism! But that was how the Divine Word talked.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Infant Baptism—Its Theological Raison d'être[1]

It would appear that the initial historical justification for infant baptism is to be found rather in the actual practice of the Church than in theological considerations. The custom was indeed a natural development, conceded where parents were Christians, from the earliest norm, adult baptism, though it is impossible to determine when and where it actually originated. The New Testament affords no evidence for the practice, though there is just a possibility (no more) that the "households" said to be baptized (Acts xvi, 15, 33; 1 Cor. i, 16) *may* have included children. Inconclusive also are the famous words of Polycarp, "Fourscore and six years have I been His servant" (*Martyrdom of Polycarp* ix), and Justin Martyr's remark that there were "many, both men and women, who have been Christ's disciples from childhood" (1 *Apol.* xv, 6). The earliest conclusive evidence is that of Irenæus towards the end of the second century; he speaks of "infants and little ones, and boys and youths and older people" as "reborn into God" (*C. Haer.* II, xxii, 4—*Omnes . . . qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, infantes, et parvulos, et pueros, et juvenes, et seniores*). At the beginning of the third century, in Africa, Tertullian, in his treatise on baptism, referred disapprovingly to the baptizing of infants: "The delay of baptism is preferable, particularly, however, in the case of children. For why is it necessary, if it is not so urgent, that the sponsors also should be brought into danger, since they may, by reason of their mortality, fail to fulfil their promises? . . . Let them come then while they are growing up; let them come while they are learning, while they are being taught whither to come; let them become Christians (*sc.* in baptism) when they have become able to know Christ. Why hurries the age of innocence to the remission of sins?" (*De Bapt.* xviii).[2] Origen, however, tried, and was in fact the first,

[1] This summary note represents in substance a memorandum prepared for the Canterbury Convocation Joint Committee on Infant Baptism, and the preamble to its Report may be read in the light of the points here summarized.

[2] This is the more striking when compared with his materialistic views in the *De Anima* on the corporeality of the soul and its supposed pollution inherited from Adam, though he does not suggest any guilt or responsibility in the individual infant. This idea of an inherited pollution was attacked by Clement of Alexandria in replying to the Gnostic Julius Cassianus. *Cf. Strom.* III, xvi.

to defend the practice theologically, as did also Cyprian, who recommended it in a famous passage (see *infra*). In the fourth century, Gregory of Nazianzus desired that baptism should normally be delayed till the age of three, except in dangerous circumstances, and it is noteworthy that many *Christian* parents did not in fact have their children baptized as infants. Such famous Fathers as Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine (in his case his mother only was a Christian in his youth), and John Chrysostom were not baptized till manhood. Clearly adult baptism was still the norm; but infant baptism was becoming more and more common, and by the middle of the fifth century might be said to have become the usual practice in those parts of the Empire which had become nominally Christian.

The attempts in the Early Church to give a theological justification of the practice are accordingly *ex post facto* attempts to find reasons parallel to those adduced in the case of adult baptism. The various aspects of baptism (*i.e.*, of adults) in the New Testament can be summed up in a twofold contrast. It is, on the one hand, the means of admission to the Church, the Body of Christ, and to the privileges and responsibilities of membership therein; and this entrance on a new kind of life, this new covenant-relation to God, is appropriately spoken of as a new birth, a " regeneration " or spiritual rebirth. On the other hand, being preceded by faith and by repentance of the sins formerly committed (all that is involved in " conversion "), it is regarded also as an " effectual sign " of the washing away of those sins. In the early Fathers, there is the same double significance of baptism (adult) as both a " seal " and a " laver."

In view of the subsequent confusion of thought, it must be emphasized that (with, I think, two exceptions, in Origen and Cyprian) the theological expositions of baptism down to the latter half of the fourth century refer to adult baptism. Further, in view of the now generally accepted historical provenance of the creed, it seems clear that the phrase " one baptism for the remission of sins " in our so-called " Nicene " creed refers to the baptism of adults and the remission of their past " actual " sins. To the emphasis on the forgiveness of past sins in baptism, and the feeling that sin after baptism was specially heinous, may be ascribed the common delay of baptism—till their death-beds in the

case of the Emperors Constantine and Constantius, and till manhood in the case of the Fathers above quoted. No notion of hereditary guilt to be remitted had yet been accepted.

As the practice of infant baptism gradually became popular, however, theological problems were bound to arise. The chief difficulty naturally was concerning the second main aspect of baptism, as a "laver" for sin. Infants have not committed *actual* sins which need forgiveness through baptism, yet baptism had always been regarded as a means of cleansing from sin; since the baptism of infants *is* practised, do infants then in some sense need cleansing, and, if so, from what? Origen, towards the middle of the third century, was the first seriously to consider this question. He asked, "Why should baptism be given to infants (*parvulis*), as is the use of the Church, seeing that if there were nothing in infants which required remission and pardon, the grace of baptism would seem superfluous?" (*In Lev. hom.* viii, 3). His question shows an undue preoccupation with the negative side of baptism, and he found an answer difficult, wavering between several views. He hazarded a theory of an inevitable birth-pollution, regarding it sometimes as physical, sometimes as moral, and suggested that this is washed away in (infant) baptism. Barely consistent with this speculation is his other more famous theory of pre-natal falls; but one must feel sympathy with this great pioneer in his unsuccessful attempt to reconcile certain passages of the Old Testament, his Platonism, and the theology of adult baptism, with the increasing practice of infant baptism. Cyprian also, in his famous *Sixty-fourth Epistle*, seems to have adopted this view of an hereditary infection, probably from his "Master," Tertullian; but his attempt to link up infant baptism with sin in some sense is hopelessly confused, though one can possibly discern in it the germ of the later doctrine of "original guilt." The most notable passage runs: "If remission of sins is given even to the worst offenders, and to those who formerly sinned much against God when they have subsequently believed, and if no one is hindered from baptism and grace, how much more ought an infant not to be hindered, who being newly born has committed no sin, save that, being born after the flesh according to Adam, he has by his first birth contracted the contagion of the ancient death (*contagium mortis antiquæ*); who indeed more easily approaches to receive remission

of sins through this very fact, that to him are remitted (*sc.* in baptism) not his own sins but another's."

One may perhaps note in passing the clear distinction which the fourth-century Father, Gregory of Nazianzus, drew, both in his *Carmina* and in his *Oration on Baptism*, and which the Pelagians later also tried to adopt, between the effects of infant and adult baptism; the former primarily brings incorporation into the Body of Christ, with all the positive consequences of that incorporation, while the latter, in addition to this, includes the remission of (actual) sins as well. Similarly today, if confession of sins is made, before adult baptism, the baptism is regarded as an " effectual sign " of their forgiveness, as is indicated in the creed, and no formal priestly absolution is given. (Cp. also the Doctrinal Report, pp. 189-90.)

It was the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius in the fifth century which really brought the theological question into great prominence. It is a fact of experience, emphasized by St Paul in Romans vii, that our human nature has been grievously affected as the result of the past sins of mankind, and that our environment predisposes us towards evil rather than towards good; we all start life with an inherited spiritual weakness or handicap, a bias towards evil, a propensity to sin; and we need divine grace to enable us to overcome this. Pelagius denied this fact of experience; while Augustine rightly affirmed it, though unhappily and unnecessarily connecting it with the story of Genesis iii, which he regarded as literal history. Unfortunately for posterity, Augustine invented the highly ambiguous term, " original sin," to describe this inherited weakness or handicap, which cannot be described as " sin " in any legitimate sense of that word. But more unfortunately still, he propounded the novel theory of " original guilt "—first explicit in Ambrose—that we inherit also a legal liability to punishment for Adam's sin; we are all equally guilty with him, for " we were in his loins " when he sinned. So (Augustine thought) we deserve God's wrath and eternal punishment, not just for our " actual " sins, but owing to the mere fact of having been born. Only God's grace can rescue us from this hopeless condition, and this is accomplished in baptism, which remits the inherited guilt, as well as bringing us into the realm of grace. Those who die unbaptized are necessarily damned, though he supposes that infants who have not committed " actual " sins will have a milder punishment.

Modern knowledge concerning man's early evolution, and our recognition that the early folk-lore in Genesis cannot be regarded as giving an exact historical account of a first man, Adam, have made no difference to that fact of experience to which Augustine gave the admittedly misleading name " original sin "; since it is based on experience and not on the primitive Genesis story to which he linked it. But his further conception of " original guilt " is on a very different footing, for it is a purely speculative theory which is in conflict with our highest moral standards and our conception of God as a moral Being, and has no warrant in Scripture. Indeed, it is noteworthy that of the three New Testament texts, John iii, 5, Romans v, 12, and Ephesians ii, 3, on which he relied for the construction of this theory, two were mistranslated or misunderstood by him. The issue was accordingly much confused in his generation; but what perhaps weighed most with his contemporaries was the fact that the Church *did* actually baptize infants, and that there must be some adequate reason for it. Yet even if Pelagius was wrong, Augustine was only partially right; and though his extremer views were somewhat modified and never adopted in an ecumenical creed or council, his influence on subsequent thought has been in some respects disastrous. Its revival through Calvin in the sixteenth century has been reflected in post-Reformation theological thought and formularies, including the Anglican; and though modern science and the historical criticism of the Bible have brought us some measure of emancipation, not all the issues have yet been faced and there is still much popular misconception as to the real position today.

Modern research has, however, shown that the extremer positions of Augustine are not to be equated with Catholic and Scriptural orthodoxy, as Vincentius of Lerinum implied in his famous *Commonitorium*. How then are we to justify the practice of infant baptism theologically, now that we cannot accept all his unwarranted speculations? Clearly we cannot talk of guilt in connection with a new-born babe. Guilt implies the accountability of some responsible person. There is guilt when a wrong action is intentionally committed, with full awareness. There is some guilt again if an " objectively " wrong action is committed, even if there is not full awareness, when we are able to know and should have known that it was wrong. But we cannot speak of guilt—nor indeed of moral virtue either—where there is

no possibility of knowledge or awareness, as with an infant. Augustine's theory of "original guilt" must be rejected not only as unscriptural and a late theological novelty, but also as irrational and non-moral; and there is therefore no question of the remission in baptism of any inherited guilt in the individual infant, even though we do acknowledge the *corporate* responsibility of the human race for the present condition of things. On this point, some of us have welcomed the fact that the 1928 Prayer Book modified the Augustinianism of the 1662 Book, and brought the theology of the baptismal offices more into line with the point of view of the New Testament and of the majority of the Greek Fathers. It is surely important too that Augustine's misinterpretation of Ephesians ii, 3, "we . . . were by nature children of wrath," as having a reference to infants, should no longer be perpetuated, as it is in the Catechism. One must also reject the semi-Manichæan idea of birth-defilement through the processes of generation, of some quasi-physical stain from which a child needs cleansing; the materialistic tendencies of the African Fathers have for too long had a baneful influence on Christian theology.

On the other hand, while regretting the invention and preferring the abandonment of so misleading and inexact a theological term as "original sin," we must at the same time affirm the truth of experience to which Augustine applied the term—the moral and spiritual weakness and handicap inherited by us all, the tendency towards evil rather than good. So the Doctrinal Report (p. 61) says, "a universal tendency to evil . . . is inherent in our actual human nature." This weakness is a consequence of all the "actual" sins of mankind, just as in our own individual lives every lapse into sin reduces our powers of resistance against the next temptation.

Now one obviously cannot speak of the remission or washing away of a weakness or a "tendency to evil," though this confusion of thought seems to be implied in the Doctrinal Report (p. 137); and indeed the "tendency," or inherited weakness, still remains after baptism, *cf.* Article IX. How then can we regard the relation of baptism to this inherited weakness? We may quite simply say, as against any incipient Pelagianism, that in infant baptism there occurs the initial imparting of the divine grace and strength which are necessary for the individual to overcome the inherited moral weakness or tendency to sin and an

adverse moral environment; it is for the individual an "earnest," a first instalment, of the benefits made available by Christ's redemption of mankind. The other main aspect of infant baptism is, of course, the same as in adult baptism; it brings incorporation into the Body of Christ, admission into an eternal fellowship; it is a new birth or spiritual regeneration.

The baptism of a dying infant may be justified on these grounds, since the Christian life is not confined to the Church Militant here on earth, and membership of Christ's Body ought to be effected, if possible, other things being equal. But if for some good reason baptism is delayed or cannot be had, and the infant dies unbaptized, the position is parallel to other cases, and we may rest content with the ancient principle, *Deus non alligatur sacramentis*.

The Doctrinal Report (pp. 137-38) deals with the difficulty "that the infant has no consciousness of what is taking place." In addition to the points there made, it may be emphasized that baptism is primarily God's acceptance of us, not our choosing of God; and baptism in infancy ensures that from our earliest days we may potentially benefit from our membership of the supernatural community. Yet there is more danger with infant baptism than with other sacramental rites of a mechanical view of its effect, since the recipient is not personally capable of repentance and faith. It is essential therefore that sponsorship should be taken seriously, so that the growing child may realize the nature and functions of the fellowship into which he has been incorporated, and be brought up in conditions which will foster the growth of the spiritual life begun at baptism. Baptism is not merely a matter of importance to the individual baptized, but is also a matter in which the whole Church is vitally concerned.

FREDERICK TINDALL.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Hodges has been Professor of Philosophy in the University of Reading since 1934.

The Rev. Austin Farrer has been Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford, since 1935.

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Mr Williams is attached to the London office of the Oxford University Press. His poem "Taliessin through Logres" was the subject of an article by Mr Lewis in the March number of *Theology*.

The Rev. Frederick Tindall, B.D., is Warden of Connaught Hall at University College, Southampton.

The Rev. G. Ian F. Thomson is the Chaplain of Hertford College, Oxford.

Mr Mackinnon is a Fellow of Keble College, Oxford.

The Rev. C. H. S. Runge, who is the editorial representative of *Theology* in South Africa, is the Provincial of the Community of the Resurrection at Rosettenville, Johannesburg.

NOTES

We gladly call attention to the fact that the *Church Quarterly Review* (April-June, 1939) contains an article by Mr E. G. P. Wyatt on the Anaphora, in which he replies to the criticisms of Dr Frere's views on this subject that were contributed by Fr A. G. Hebert, S.S.M., and Dom Gregory Dix, O.S.B., to *Theology* in August and November, 1938, respectively.

A PRACTICAL ADVENTURE IN CHRISTIAN UNITY

Purpose.—During the Easter vacation a party of twenty graduates and undergraduates from Oxford spent a fortnight on the continent, visiting several religious communities, in order to understand their worship and spiritual life, and to further the cause of reunion. The three most recent conferences of the Ecumenical Movement, the influence of a wealth of literature on the subject of reunion, the natural aspiration towards the ideal of unity, and, most of all, the movement of the Spirit throughout Christendom, have all had their repercussions in Oxford, and aroused an intelligent interest which has inspired this experiment. The trip was designed to visit three centres—to see something of Eastern Orthodoxy, the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches, and Roman Catholicism. It was hoped last summer perhaps even to visit some theological centre in Germany, but enquiry soon made it apparent that any party conference would only serve as an embarrassment to those who received us.

Preparation.—The Easter term was spent in careful preparation

for the trip. Study groups were held each week. Altogether over sixty persons attended in the course of the term, though unfortunately many were unable to come on the trip. Papers were read on "The Problem of Unity," "Russian Eastern Orthodoxy in Paris," "The Lutheran and Reformed Churches," "The Russian Church in Exile," "The Order of St Benedict," and "The Church in Germany." Speakers included Dr Nicholas Zernov, of the Fellowship of SS. Alban and Sergius, Dom Justin McCann, O.S.B., Master of St Benet's Hall, and the Rev. Nathaniel Micklem, Principal of Mansfield College.

Program—Paris.—The party left London for Paris on March 13, as soon as full term was over. Professor L. Zander and Mr Alexis Okounieff, who had been chiefly responsible for planning our program there, welcomed us on arrival, and were our guides for the next four days. We spent the whole of the first morning in Paris at the Russian Academy in the Rue du Crimée, where we were greatly impressed by what we saw. We were shown the chapel, two small dormitories in which thirty students have to live, the two lecture rooms which are also their library, reading and common rooms. We met Fr Cassian and Brother Lampetre. Everywhere we saw evidence of material want, and were moved to admiration by such courageous work in the face of stark poverty and necessity. Nothing impressed us more than the depth of spiritual life around us.

Professor Zander gave a stimulating lecture on the foundation of the Academy, explaining the method of training, and the work of the Russian Church. Over fifty priests have already been trained and sent out from this one Academy, which is the only training centre of the Russian Orthodox Church remaining in the world. No less than twenty-five parishes have been built up since the War for the care of Russians in Paris alone. And all this despite the tremendous odds against them of poverty and insecurity and lack of church funds. Great emphasis is laid on the spiritual fitness of each individual ordinand. It is not enough once to have had a sense of vocation. No mechanical succession of examinations qualifies him for the priesthood, but a strong and continuous vocation, together with holiness of life and good scholarship. The fact that priests cannot be ordained before marriage ensures that the wives of the clergy have also an eagerness and vocation for the work of God. We were also told of the significant part played by the laity in matters of faith, election and policy. We concluded the morning by lunching very simply with the students in their small dining hall, and experienced our first sung grace and silent meal.

In the afternoon we saw something of the social side of their work—a home for the unemployed. Here forty men lived in the simplest way possible, and sixty others came in to meals. Their cost of living is only 25 centimes a day, the men being fed on soup, and such fish and vegetables as are no longer

marketable in shops. One could not help being filled with pity and compassion for them. The stringency of French regulations prohibits these Russian exiles from making any real success of life. In trade and occupation they cannot be promoted or rise to any position of responsibility.

That evening we met some Protestant students, and heard something of the difficulties of their work in an indifferent university atmosphere. It was pathetic to hear that no religious meetings could ever be held in the university, and that no spiritual care seemed to be provided for the Protestant students except by the S.C.M.

Our second day began with attendance at a celebration of the Liturgy at the Russian Cathedral in the Rue Daru. We were tremendously impressed by the large number of people present, by their devotion and the really splendid singing. As a result of exile the people are looking to the Church, increasingly, as their only true home. We were struck by the obvious warmth of friendship amongst the people, and also by their living sense of the Communion of Saints.

In the afternoon we visited the Russian S.C.M. House, where they have built for themselves a beautiful chapel. There is a crèche for fifteen young children—orphans, strays, and children of working families—also a library and rooms for study groups. Elsewhere in Paris the Russians have another crèche for fifty children. There we learnt of the magnificent work of Miss Zernov, who makes it possible for children of all ages to go abroad. Each year two hundred children are sent or invited to Switzerland, from babies to young people of eighteen, as a break from their environment of poverty and exile. A few are invited to England, but never yet more than twenty. As far as possible they help in the homes of their hosts. In the evening we visited a number of Russian homes in twos and threes. There again we saw the courage of the people, and realized how much their lives are focused around the Russian Church.

Our third full day was spent at a conference at Bièvres, outside Paris, at the country house of the French S.C.M. No less than fifty young Russians spent the day with us. They very kindly held their opening service in English for our benefit, and this was followed by a talk by the Very Rev. George Florovsky. He spoke of the tremendous value of such friendly and personal contacts, and especially of meeting such a representative gathering of Anglican laity rather than official representatives of the clergy. He spoke at length of the nature of the Church and of reunion, and contrasted the spiritual life of the Orthodox and Anglican communions. A later session in the afternoon gave us an opportunity of sharing our impressions, and of discussing reunion in an atmosphere of true fellowship and affinity. The conference ended with Anglican Evensong, at which Russians were present. Fr Florovsky concluded the

service by chanting the Blessing in Russian. We all felt that the conference had gone a long way in giving us a new vision of what harmony and co-operation can mean in the Catholic Church, and of realizing the richness of our common Christian inheritance. We all recognized and admired the true Spirit of Christ that abounded in the lives of those we met. Israel in exile in Babylon must have been as Russia in exile in Paris. God seemed to have some great and hidden plan in store—maybe the sympathetic understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy by Anglicanism, by the projection of one section of that Church into the province of Western Christianity. To see church life being built up from bedrock, to see community life increasing and taking responsibility as it must have done in the first centuries, and to see the reformulation as it were of Eastern theology being undertaken by such a body of competent leaders and theologians, was to be filled with a sense of the heroic, and to feel convinced of the need of greater sacrifice and spiritual life in our own communion. The three days also revealed more clearly than ever that uniformity of expression is the least desirable of all forms of unity, organic, doctrinal, or liturgical. Already we had begun to see the Church of God as a spiritual cohesion given from above, a great inheritance, and a practical relationship of love and co-operation.

Strasbourg.—We stayed only three days in Strasbourg, our next centre, where the Rev. Theo Preiss, Principal of the Protestant Seminary, had arranged an interesting program for us at very short notice. We had expected to go to Basle, but only a fortnight before leaving England this was found not to be practicable.

Our first evening we studied together the 13th chapter of St Mark, with about thirty members of the French Protestant S.C.M. The following day we visited the Seminary with its excellent library, especially of old editions of Reformation theology. Later we met Professor F. Menegoz and Professor R. Will in discussion, and heard of the situation of the Protestant Churches in France. On Sunday, March 19, we were invited to have our Anglican celebration of Holy Communion in the Lutheran Church of St Pierre-le-Jeune. As leader, I celebrated, assisted by two of our party, and the service was attended by Lutherans, French Reformed, Anglicans, and one Roumanian Eastern Orthodox. After breakfast we went to a Lutheran service in German and a Calvinist service in French, where we were warmly welcomed by the pastor, Dr Boergner, from the pulpit. He further explained to the congregation the object of our visit. We were greatly disappointed not to have seen more of the Calvinists during this trip.

Two days' travel through Germany, with a night on the Rhine at St Goarshausen, brought us to Amay on the Meuse, in Belgium, where we stayed four days.

Benedictine Priory, Amay.—The Priory at Amay was founded

by the late pope for the express purpose of studying Russian Eastern Orthodoxy, with a view to reunion. Finding that the Orthodox themselves have many leanings towards Anglicanism, and many points in common, the monks of Amay have of necessity interested themselves in the Anglican Church. Not only did they allow us to come, but they welcomed us in the spirit of their Order. Several monks were deputed to give us a varied and extremely interesting series of lectures, ranging from talks on monasticism, the Order of St Benedict, the foundation of Amay, to explanations of the Liturgy, the origin of Gregorian and Greek chanting, and a lantern lecture on Icons.

There were many occasions for discussions with the monks, and we were invited to join in all the services both in the Latin and Byzantine rites. Though we were continuously conscious of tremendous differences of outlook and emphasis, the spirit of friendship was warm. On the last day of our stay we were present as a party at the liturgy of the Presanctified Gifts and at the service of the Eve of the Annunciation in the Byzantine rite. The Prior assured us that to the best of his knowledge it was probably the first occasion that a party of Anglicans had ever stayed in a Roman Catholic monastery, and that our stay had proved a successful experiment.

Conclusion.—This survey of the experiment being of necessity short, and therefore more in the nature of a catalogue of activities, can give little impression of the true value of the trip. Nor can it really express more than the personal impressions of the leader. Nevertheless, the experiment can certainly be said to have been a great success and worthy of repetition.

The Oxford party itself was representatively Anglican, including all shades of churchmanship and tradition. Westcott House and Wycliffe Hall were represented, together with four ordinands from St Stephen's House and Ripon Hall. Seven of the party came from Hertford, and the rest from six other Oxford colleges. Two-thirds of the party were ordinands. The fact that twenty people experienced such unity amongst themselves is itself a justification for the trip and a proof of the fundamental spirit of unity. The party were not blind to the thousands of difficulties in the path of reunion; nor did they go in anything but a spirit of humility and inquiry. The trip had the effect of giving us a new pride in our own Church, and of showing us how much the Anglican Church can do to bring about reunion. If mutual understanding and appreciation are the first steps to unity, then something has been achieved. If friendship and practical co-operation are to be the means of bringing it about, then there is place for every experiment . . . that all may be one in Christ.

G. Ian F. Thomson.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONDITIONS FOR A JUST WAR

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In your January number Mr Mascall mentions six conditions for a just war which have been laid down by "theologians." I have one question to ask, and a number of problems to raise, about these rules. The question is merely historical. Who are these theologians, and what kind or degree of authority can they claim over members of the Church of England? The problems are more difficult. Condition 4 lays down that "it must be morally certain that the losses, to the belligerents, the world, and religion, will not outweigh the advantages of winning"; and 6, that "there must be a considerable probability of winning." It is plain that equally sincere people can differ to any extent and argue for ever as to whether a proposed war fulfils these conditions or not. The practical question, therefore, which faces us is one of authority. Who has the duty of deciding when the conditions are fulfilled, and the right of enforcing his decision? Modern discussions tend to assume without argument that the answer is "The private conscience of the individual," and that any other answer is immoral and totalitarian. Now it is certain, in some sense, that "no duty of obedience can justify a sin," as Mr Mascall says. Granted that capital punishment is compatible with Christianity, a Christian may lawfully be a hangman; but he must not hang a man whom he knows to be innocent. But will anyone interpret this to mean that the hangman has the *same* duty of investigating the prisoner's guilt which the judge has? If so, no executive can work and no Christian state is possible; which is absurd. I conclude that the hangman has done his duty if he has done his share of the general duty, resting upon all citizens alike, to ensure, so far as in him lies, that we have an honest judicial system; if, in spite of this, and unknowingly, he hangs an innocent man, then a sin has been committed, but not by him. This analogy suggests to me that it must be absurd to give to the private citizen the *same* right and duty of deciding the justice of a given war which rests on governments; and I submit that the rules for determining what wars are just[1] were originally rules for the guidance of princes, not subjects. This does not mean that private persons must obey governments commanding them to do what they know is sin; but perhaps it does mean (I write it with some reluctance) that the ultimate decision as to what the situation at a given moment is in the highly complex field of international affairs is one which must be delegated.

[1] *E.g.*, Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, II. IIæ, xl. ii.

No doubt we must make every effort which the constitution allows to ensure a good government and to influence public opinion; but in the long run, the nation, as a nation, must act, and it can act only through its government. (It must be remembered that there are risks in both directions: if war is ever lawful, then peace is sometimes sinful.) What is the alternative? That individuals ignorant of history and strategy should decide for themselves whether condition 6 ("a considerable probability of winning") is, or is not, fulfilled?—or that every citizen, neglecting his own vocation and not weighing his capacity, is to become an expert on all the relevant, and often technical, problems?

Decisions by the private conscience of each Christian in the light of Mr Mascall's six rules would divide Christians from each other and result in no clear Christian witness to the pagan world around us. But a clear Christian witness might be attained in a different way. If all Christians consented to bear arms at the command of the magistrate, and if all, after that, refused to obey anti-Christian orders, should we not get a clear issue? A man is much more certain that he ought not to murder prisoners or bomb civilians than he ever can be about the justice of a war. It is perhaps here that "conscientious objection" ought to begin. I feel certain that one Christian airman shot for refusing to bomb enemy civilians would be a more effective martyr (in the etymological sense of the word) than a hundred Christians in jail for refusing to join the army.

Christendom has made two efforts to deal with the evil of war—chivalry and pacifism. Neither succeeded. But I doubt whether chivalry has such an unbroken record of failure as pacifism.

The question is a very dark one. I should welcome about equally refutation, or development, of what I have said.

I am, sir,

Your obedient servant,

C. S. Lewis.

Magdalen College, Oxford.
February 27, 1939.

THE CHURCH IN RUMANIA

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

The survey in your last number on Rumanian religious thinking calls in justice for correction and amplification, more than can be given in a short letter, but these facts are worth attention:

(i) There is a great deal of sound theological thinking and teaching—*e.g.*, the work of Bp Irineu Mihalcescu, formerly professor in the Bucarest Faculty; of Bp Maghier of Arad; of

the Archim. Scriban; of Dr Staniloae, whose valuable study of St Gregory Palamas has just appeared; and of many others.

(ii) Orthodox theologians are mainly concerned with the interpretation of Orthodox theology, and, with the exception of the Paris School, not so much with "theologoumena." It is easy, with our own history, to underestimate the value of this, or to label it deprecatingly "conservative."

(iii) The picture of the training and life of the parish clergy is both inadequate and liable to leave a false impression. In Rumania it is the Christian countryman who is the backbone of the country. He believes deeply in the divine ruling of life, and, called by God, he becomes a priest. He is content to live on simply in the village community, and his training is given to that end. It is too easy to use the words "peasant" and "backward" in a derogatory sense, failing to see the positive values in a way of life that industrialized England has forgotten.

(iv) Any survey of the most live of the Orthodox Churches to-day should surely have included mention of such things as the new and active sociological interest; the recoveries and new tendencies in the Religious Life (*e.g.*, the establishment of a monastery for educated monks by the Abp of Sibiu); the new regulation about the Theological Academies, etc.

Your contributor will, I hope, forgive these criticisms, though I find it hard to understand how he could have visited Rumania "missing so much and so much."

Yours faithfully,
VICTOR SHEARBURN, C.R.

COMMENT ON PERIODICALS

(*a*) THEOLOGICAL

IN *The Expository Times*[1] (March) Mr Norman H. Snaith continues the "After Fifty Years" series with "The Background of the Psalms." Another survey of modern thought, on the Atonement, is given by Dr Hywel Hughes, of Swansea. The "Problems of To-day" section deals with the urgent question of ministerial training. Here, Principal Wheeler Robinson writes sympathetically from his own experience. Many will think him too much attached to the old syllabus and its value of "mental training." But he clearly recognizes the danger of academicism and the need for informal seminars to bring "the great theological issues into relation with the preached word," and to correlate them with "the living issues of the day." In *The Harvard Theological Review*[2] (January), Dr A. D. Nock has

[1] T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh. 10d.
[2] Harvard University Press, $1. Quarterly.

an article on "A Feature of Roman Religion." From a study of certain details in sacrificial rites he deduces that "the control of religion was centralized at Rome in a degree unknown in Greece, and those who controlled it claimed that their decisions were valid in heaven as on earth." He thus pushes back into pagan times the legal characteristic of the Latin Church. In *The Anglican Theological Review*[1] (January) Dr Sherman E. Johnson sketches a proposed form-critical treatment of Acts. While admitting that Luke used more of an historian's freedom in Acts than his gospel, he suggests that form-criticism may show that "the difference between the two volumes is one of degree, not of kind." *Etudes*[2] (March) is full of contemporary interest, with articles on Pius XI and the problems of his age, the Far Eastern struggle, and the social legislation of the Third Reich. The Jesuit *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*[3] (February) focuses its concern on the problem of racialism and Christianity. There are articles on the antecedents of racialist ideology, the political racialism of the Third Reich, the anthropological standpoint, and a fine summing-up under the title "La race, la raison et le Christ." Lastly, there are printed the relevant papal pronouncements, and a letter of the S. Congrégation des Séminaires et Universités. The catholic and humanist traditions are here united in their defence of universalism. P. Charles' historical survey shows how the Aristotelian distinction between free and slave, Greek and barbarian, was made to look small in face of the achievement of Alexander's hellenism and the new universal humanity of both stoic and Christian thought. The achievement was permanent, though there have been minor reactions, like the refusal of some sixteenth-century Spaniards to regard the South American Indian as properly human. But to-day, as we all know, this monstrous doctrine has lifted up its ugly head over half Europe. The *Nouvelle Revue* has done good work by its stimulating symposium, which demonstrates the humane and reasonable strength of the catholic faith.

E. W. Edmonds.

(*b*) Literary

In the February *Blackfriars*[4] "Penguin" welcomes our new "gay yellow cover" (which has been blessed of late by "Damon" in *The New English Weekly*) and discusses Archdeacon Hunter's article on Worship at some length. Fr Henry St John begins a discussion of the Doctrinal Report and Fr Hebert's Memorandum upon it, called on the cover, "The Memorandum." (Seemingly just now there is but one.) This is continued in March under the title of "Movement in the Church of England," and

[1] Illinois, $1. Quarterly.
[2] Paris, 4fr. Monthly.
[3] Louvain. Monthly.
[4] Blackwell, Oxford. 1s.

deserves closer attention than can possibly be given to it in the limits of this summary. We will only note that Fr St John has a very remarkable eye for what is really important, and that unlike many Roman Catholic writers on Anglicanism he seems to know what it feels like to be an Anglican. D. A. Traversi was associated with Mr Martin Turnell in *Arena*, that remarkable offshoot of the *Colosseum* which died too soon. Since then he has several times written in *Scrutiny* [1] to another audience, less Catholic and more critical. In the March number he is very candid about the limitations of a popular Roman Catholic success: " Papini's Catholicism," he writes, " seems to have done almost nothing to protect him from the more unfortunate influences of modern Italian culture." The same number contains a nice dig at Professor Macmurray from Mr D. W. Harding: " The method is . . . gradually to colour some word with emotional significance derived from an intuition: the intuition being unstated, untested, and therefore unusable outside the confines of the holy haze. The most important instance is the word ' personal '." Mrs Leavis blesses a second novel by Mrs Ruth Adam (*There Needs no Ghost*, from Chapman and Hall) with some reservations: " Exposure of false values is always Mrs Adam's strong suit. She is also masterly here in demonstrating the ineffectiveness of simple goodness in dealing with the political scene as well as the unexpected strength of the *anima naturaliter christiana* in personal relations." *The London Mercury* [2] has flirted with modernism, but at the bottom it has stood for a far less austere code. This is obvious in the manner of the memorial to Yeats this March. The articles dwell rather on the romantic visionary than on the Yeats we know, the old man purged, whose spiritism seems more than a mere relic of the nineties, Walter Pater, and A. E., something belonging to the *nouveau moyen âge* whose coming he heralded in *Byzantium*. And the four last poems are not so good as those he published there a few months ago. It seems worth while to draw attention to the devotional books number with which *Time and Tide* [3] began Lent. The orthodox bias seems to be spreading from the end into the middle of that curiously variegated paper. *The New English Weekly* [4] remains theologically interesting at both ends, and sociologically sometimes very exciting. It is the only newspaper that never seems to get hysterical.

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

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[1] Deighton Bell and Co., Cambridge. 2s. 6d. [2] 10, Great Turnstile, High Holborn, W.C. 1. 2s. [3] 32, Bloomsbury Street, W.C. 1. [4] 7 and 8, Rolls Passage, Chancery Lane, E.C. 4. 6d.

SURVEYS

(A) CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

As this survey is the first such attempted in these pages, and as the subjects it attempts to embrace are of outstanding importance, it might not be improper to refer readers again to Maritain's *Humanisme Intégral* (Eng. trans. *True Humanism*), perhaps the most important single book on the subject that has recently appeared. It is admittedly difficult, but it admirably illustrates the proper method of Christian sociology, revealing at once its dependence on dogmatic theology and its issue in practice. It is likely at least for a time to remain almost a standard work on its subject; its supersession as such will, it seems to me, come only as the fruit of discussion of its many important suggestions.

Christian social thought at the moment is admittedly in a fluid state. In spite of the recent journalistic excursions of Mr Kenneth Ingram, it seems true to say that the Christian "Left" possesses no longer any real importance. The recognition of the fundamental incompatibility of dialectical materialism with the presuppositions of the Christian faith may now be regarded as an intellectual *fait accompli*. We need not be accused, *e.g.*, of lack of sympathy for the appalling fate of the Spanish republicans, or of a general ostrich-response to contemporary events, if we make this unequivocally clear. We must realize that the Marxian philosophy offers a serious intellectual challenge to Christians, but a challenge which can be met, not by compromise, but by the determined effort to elaborate alternatives to its theses that are in conformity with faith and reason, and by the willing recognition of the obligation in this our day to realize a new dimension of Christian living, in which the unity of the faith with the practice it inspires is exhibited in the life of the mystical Body. On the subject of Marxism, I would like to commend Père Ducatillon's dispassionate analysis in the volume in the series—Présences—entitled *Les Communistes et les Chrétiens*, of which the Paladin Press has recently published a translation.

But the fluidity of Christian social thought remains, and we must recognize that that is a direct consequence of the absence of agreement on a profound theological issue. It would seem that the Modernist episode in the history of the Christian Church is drawing to a close. In recent years we have been compelled to see in Modernism before all else "an attempt to substitute for supernatural theology a naturalistic philosophy of religion," and the recognition that such a substitution is destructive of the very foundation of any world-view that would claim the authority of the New Testament is more or less complete. The premiss of its writers is the recognition of the invasion, in the person of the Christ, of the natural order by the

transcendent God, who is master of history, and of the affordance thereby to man of a revelation of his nature and destiny that can never be superseded. We can, perhaps, make clear to ourselves by the employment of natural reason the content of that revelation, but we can never hope, nor endeavour, to supersede its disclosures. The philosophy of religion underlying such a book as Sir Will Spens' *Belief and Practice* is, in my judgment, fundamentally destructive of Christianity.

I said above that we can perhaps hope to make clear to ourselves by the employment of natural reason the content of that revelation, and I would ask the reader to note that *perhaps*. For among Christians there is at this point profound disagreement. The problem may pose itself intellectually as the relation of reason and revelation, or ethically as that of responsibility and grace. But no student of the material can deny that the uncertainty and lack of unanimity underlying so many of our actual responses, as Christians, to the concrete situations of the moment are due to fundamental theological disagreements concerning the relations of nature and grace.

We must, it seems to me, if we are to attempt the redemption of the social order, undertake the most serious thinking concerning this problem. An attitude towards it that is fundamentally Thomist underlies Maritain's work, and also much of the valuable sociological commentary to be found in *Blackfriars*. It is a problem which Anglicans have long neglected (or sought to resolve, as Prof. C. C. J. Webb, in his *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, by some ingenious word-play), as the balance of the Doctrinal Commission Report suggests. But it is of all problems the most fundamental, and I would like to commend to those who are prepared to face its implications two French works that I have found singularly helpful—Père A. Gardeil, O.P., *Le Donné Révélé et la Théologie* (Editions du Cerf); l'Abbé Verriele, *Le Surnaturel en nous et le Péché originel* (Bloud et Gay).

There is a cognate problem, and one on which the apparent imminence of catastrophe focuses our attention, and that is the necessity of a Christian understanding of history. I say a cognate problem, for any who have read, *e.g.*, Fr J. V. Langmead Casserley's profound studies in *Christendom* on the *marturia* of the "remnant" will recognize that, beneath his profoundly disturbing but seemingly irrefutable conclusions, there is at least a *prima facie* opposition to the views of the relations of nature and grace underlying, *e.g.*, Fr Gerald Vann's *Morals makyth Man*. If we regard history, as the Christian must, as the stage on which is wrought out the dialectic of grace and nature, we must understand the terms of the conflict. *Omnia abeunt in theologiam.*[1]

[1] Of this I shall say more in a forthcoming article on Professor MacMurray's *Clue to History*.

We pass to note some books, and here we give first place to Mr Oakeshott's volume *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 10s. 6d.). It is a source-book, and attempts to introduce the reader to some of the classical documents of the various social and political attitudes of modern Europe. As an *œuvre de vulgarisation*, it is perhaps successful in its exposition of the doctrine of Marxian communism, but it certainly fails to do justice to the inwardness and truly revolutionary character of Catholic social theory. Admittedly the language of the Encyclicals sounds strange in our ears, but even so his selection of quotations omits some of the most significant papal utterances. Catholic social theory is selected as a type of natural law theory. This in a sense it is, but it differs profoundly from certain forms of natural law theory in that the attitude it takes up is before all else religious. Its conception of the natural is unintelligible apart from the notion of divine grace that at once perfects and preserves it. When Pius XI said that "the destiny of the human family is in our hands," it was simply to this keystone of the whole arch of Catholic social thought that he called attention. Moreover, are "many of the principles which belong to the historic doctrines of Conservatism to be found in this Catholic doctrine"? We may perhaps answer in the affirmative if we are thinking in terms of the Toryism of an older day, but the utterances of the Encyclicals Mr Oakeshott quotes cut too deep to delude anyone into supposing that the Catholic view of the social order is compatible with that subordination of the common good to sectional interests the National Government is concerned to conserve. Judgment upon a society that permits the malignant inquisition of the U.A.B. is writ large on every page.

We pass next to note two books that are well worth reading, if only because they help us to use terms correctly—Luigi Sturzo, *Morals and Politics* (Burns Oates, 7s. 6d.); Christopher Dawson, *Beyond Politics* (Sheed and Ward, 3s. 6d.). Neither is easy to read, but both do make serious efforts to illuminate the sense of such terms as totalitarianism, community, state, party. Dawson's is in this respect particularly helpful, and his pages contain many timely warnings against the over-simplification of complex issues. Don Sturzo covers a wide field and makes many significant observations on the moral basis of politics.

Mrs Barbara Wall has given us an admirable translation of Daniel-Rops' *La Misère et nous* (Burns Oates). This brief study of the effects of destitution is the work of a prominent French Catholic intellectual, and is perhaps, of all books published recently, the most useful to thrust into the hands of the bourgeois Christian who thinks that religion "has nothing to do with these things."

We must also note the appearance of Professor J. B. S. Haldane's *The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences* (Allen and Unwin, 5s.). Much of it is profoundly silly, but Christians ought not to

neglect the state of affairs of which it is a symptom. What is it in the Marxian dialectic that attracts a scientist of Haldane's eminence? We have said above that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the Christian faith and Marxist theory. True enough, but Marxism does supply to the bewildered at once a rule for understanding the dialectic of history, and at the same time enables him to conform his action to the exigencies of its conflicts. If Marxism, which is strengthening its hold on intellectuals, has anything to offer them, it is an understanding of events that makes significant action possible. As Christians, it is here we fail lamentably. We need a recovery of prophecy —an awareness of the true ends of man that will give us insight into the consequences of departure from their pursuit, and a determined effort, in season and out of season, to seek, by our own impact upon the situation, to restore all things to their norm " in Christ." If our approach to the contemporary scene is theological, much of our judgment will at first sound strange in the ears of our brethren as well as of those without the Christian family. The appearance of such a book as Haldane's is an evidence of the degree of our own apostasy. But in the formulation of such a theological judgment we are doing no more than our simple duty as Christians. And such an understanding as will make the judgment possible demands as its standards the Christian anthropology and sociology. For this reason, if for none other, clear thinking concerning the relations of nature and grace is essential. Indeed, the whole body of Christian social thought can be rightly regarded simply as a moment in the explication of the manifold dependence of the natural upon the supernatural, and Christian social action as the impact of that latter upon the former in the anguish of its disintegration.

Note.—We are faced with the possible emergence of a war situation. Indeed, the Archbishop of Canterbury has already made his first recruiting speech. For those who wish rather, in the event of a commencement of hostilities, to base their participation or non-participation upon the conformity of the war in question to the pattern of the " just war," we would like to commend the Pax pamphlets (Hague and Gill). Their price is 6d. each, and they are admirably suited for the tract-case. They do not necessarily command a unanimous agreement with their findings, but they embody at least an authentic Christian response to an appallingly perplexing problem. We would specially commend Fr Gerald Vann's *Commonsense, Christianity, and War*, an admirable combination of empiricism, insight, and Christianity. Whether any modern war can possibly be considered " just " is an open question, and as a necessary consequence, Christian participation or non-participation must in the last resort be a matter of individual decision.

We would also like again to refer to the work of Fr Casserley.

His *Christendom* articles demand the closest study in this connexion; his standpoint is different in important respects from Fr Vann's, but the attitudes of the two writers are by no means irreconcilable. It is perhaps on the reconciliation of the Thomism of the one with the Biblicism of the other that the emergence of a true Christian response to impending events depends. Of this more in another place.

D. M. Mackinnon.

(B) THE CHURCH IN SOUTH AFRICA

"The Church of the Province of South Africa (otherwise known as the Church of England, or the English Church, or Church of the Anglican Communion in these parts)"—as it describes itself in the preamble to its Constitution—consists of fourteen dioceses, ten within the Union of South Africa and the neighbouring British protectorates, one in Southern Rhodesia, two missionary dioceses, in the mandated territory of South-West Africa (Damaraland) and Portuguese East Africa (Lebombo), and the diocese of St Helena. It has had, like South Africa itself, a stormy history. The first bishop of Cape Town, Robert Gray, was sent out from England in 1847, and it was by his energy and persistence in the face of much opposition and a long series of legal actions that the group of dioceses into which his original see was divided eventually established in 1870 its constitutional position as an independent province of the Anglican Communion. The organization of the Anglican Communion to-day owes much to the clear grasp of principles, and to the obstinate insistence upon them, of Robert Gray and the South African Church. Small in numbers compared with the whole population of South Africa, it yet has considerable influence. The Anglican bishops are generally regarded in all denominations as the leaders of English-speaking Christianity, as the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church speak for those of Dutch origin. What follows is chiefly concerned with the Church within the borders of the Union of South Africa, for it is there primarily that it has to meet problems that are peculiarly acute and urgent.

The Union of South Africa, an independent self-governing Dominion within the British Commonwealth, is in area about five times the size of Great Britain. Its population of all races is about 9½ millions. Of these only the 2 million whites have full rights of citizenship, and with them the responsibility of ruling 6½ million native Africans and another million of Indians and "coloured" (half-caste) people.

The Union is in a unique position in relation to the other states concerned in the development of Africa and its peoples.

Here people of European race are not only engaged in exploiting the material wealth of Africa and controlling the development of the native Africans, but have now for generations made their own homes on African soil. They have to share their homeland with the vastly more numerous natives, whose labour on the land and in the mines and industries enables them to make a comfortable living—indeed makes the financial prosperity of South Africa the envy of the rest of the world.

The relations between the Europeans and the other races constitute the outstanding problem of South African life. In this the Church must be vitally concerned, for the questions involved are not merely social, political, economic, but above all and in the first place theological and religious.

In the past there has been a conflict between the policies advocated in the main respectively by the two sections of the white population—those of British and those of Dutch origin. These traditional policies are represented on the one hand by the phrase of Cecil Rhodes, " Equal rights for all civilized men south of the Zambesi," which expresses the policy of the old Cape Colony; and on the other by the provision in the Constitution of the old Boer republic of the Transvaal, " There shall be no equality between black and white either in Church or State."

The project of Union in 1910 was nearly wrecked by the reluctance of the Cape Colony to compromise on this subject. Eventually each of the four uniting provinces retained its own system, and the Cape trusted that agreement would come about in time by the conversion of the northern provinces to the Cape policy. In the event it is the other tradition that has prevailed, and the whole country is now committed to a policy designed to keep the black man *as such* permanently in a condition of subordination to and dependence upon the white.

The victory of the Transvaal policy has been partly due to the other deep cleavage in South African society—that between those of British and those of Dutch origin, which divides the white population in the ratio of about two to three. Those on the British side who took part with conviction in the Boer War of 1899-1902 believed that the final justification of their cause was their care for the welfare of the natives. " If it were not for my having some conscience about the treatment of the blacks," wrote Lord Milner in 1897, " I could win over the Dutch in the colony, and indeed in all the South African dominions, in my term of office and without offending the English. You have only to sacrifice ' the nigger ' absolutely and the game is easy."

After the Boer War the British behaved with magnanimity. Within a few years the conquered Boer republics were enjoying self-government, and the loyal co-operation of ex-enemy Boer generals and troops in the Great War seemed the conclusive vindication of Great Britain's generosity. In the years that have followed great efforts have been made to consolidate this

achievement. Gradually the British have relinquished their dominant position in the government and administration of the country in order to take the Afrikaner (as the South African of Dutch ancestry is proud to call himself) into fullest partnership. The sacrifices made have been great, with genuine desire to carry out the spirit of the settlement, but one of the sacrifices has been that of the native peoples. Partnership was impossible otherwise. The United Party, now in charge of the government, would not exist unless the old Cape policy had been abandoned.

On this question nearly all Afrikaners are at one. They are divided on almost every other, and especially on the question of co-operation with the British. There is a section which strives to unite Afrikanerdom in opposition to all who do not share their language and culture. It is claimed that such are intruders, for whom South Africa is not really home, and for whom ties overseas outweigh the interests of South Africa. The movement is being reinforced in these days with racial doctrines imported from Germany, with the inevitable accompaniment of anti-Semitism and wholesale intolerance.

Christians in South Africa are thus faced in an acute form with the racialism and perverted nationalism by which Christianity is challenged in Europe to-day. In South Africa the complications are unusual. The doctrines which seem to deny Christianity are supported in its very name. The strongly national Dutch Reformed Church tends to foster rather than correct the Old Testament outlook of its adherents. The descendants of the pioneers who trekked inland to be free of the British Government, and founded the Boer republics, are still haunted by the fear of the black warriors with whom their forefathers treated, by whom they were fiercely attacked and many barbarously slaughtered, whose power at last they broke. Those forefathers had for generations been out of contact with European thought. Subordination, even slavery, seemed to them the natural condition for the black man. They found in their Bibles a mirror reflecting their own experience, as they advanced under God's guidance into their promised land. The old Boer attitude persists among their descendants to-day. It appears to have the sanction of religion. So also does the national exclusiveness of the Afrikaners. The old pieties of the simple farmers and pioneers were threatened by the flood of prospectors, including many Jews, who began to come among them two generations ago seeking diamonds and gold; and of recent years this corruption of the old Afrikanerdom has continued, as many have trekked from the country to find employment in the mines and industries of the towns. The Dutch Reformed Church buttresses its genuine desire to preserve the old piety with a strong appeal to national sentiment; and exclusiveness, intolerance and a growing anti-Semitism are promoted in the name of Christianity.

On the other side English-speaking Christianity of all

denominations has its grave weaknesses. Of the English-speaking white population perhaps half, probably rather less, are nominally Anglican. The Church of the Province has enjoyed the prestige of representing the English section in religion; and it has been the ruling section, including generally Governors and Governors-General and many of the most prominent people in the country. Hence there is a strong flavour of the Union Jack about it. Moreover, the bishops and most of the clergy have come from England. Some stay for life, but many, including some bishops, return after a while to England, which remains for them "home." The outspoken championship of the natives by South African bishops is often commended in England. It carries weight with their own people, but the vast majority of Afrikaners resent it deeply. They scorn the criticism and admonitions of people from overseas. It is vain to insist that policy depends upon principles, and principles are the same all the world over. The Afrikaner retorts that he has only one country, only one possible home, and he does not propose to risk its being ruled by black men. And there is a further weakness in the Church's case. Missionary work among the natives is extensive, but it has been largely inspired and financed from England. The white laity have to provide their own churches and clergy without any help from ancient endowments, but this does not account for all their apathy and sometimes their opposition. Many repudiate the attitude to the native which their spiritual leaders uphold. Hence the white supervision of the native part of the Church and the missionary work tends to be even more distinctively British than the rest. There are signs that the Government is concerned at the extent to which native education is in English hands. In some parts English mission schools are being brought under closer control, in order to stress the teaching of Afrikaans and try to reduce the pro-English bias of native sentiment.

Thus racialism and nationalism challenge the Church in South Africa to-day; and because the leading Christian bodies have a strongly national bias the questions are distorted and the real points at issue obscured. The problems involved are considered solely from the standpoint of expediency; any claim that human relations must be considered first from the standpoint of theology and religion is dismissed as soon as made. How then shall genuine Christian doctrine be taught to those who govern South Africa unless the Church can rise above all particular racial and national limitations? It is not merely without but within the Church that nationalism is a menace to the sovereignty of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Herein is surely one of the tests of Anglicanism. Is it an article for export? Can it shed its particular national bias and present the Gospel unadulterated to be received and integrated into a different, non-British, national environment? It has

done so, we are told, in other parts of the world. It can surely do so also in South Africa.

There is growing up to-day a generation of white South Africans less conscious of ancestral distinctions, speaking both the languages of the country with equal ease, recognizing primarily a common South African heritage. Among them there is also a growing interest in and concern for the native peoples. It is with these people that the hope for the future lies. Only if it can learn to speak to this generation, not in terms of a merely English tradition, but with the universal claim of the Catholic faith, is there likely to be an effective future for the Church of the Province of South Africa.

C. H. S. Runge, C.R.

BOOK REVIEWS

HISTORY AND THE GOSPEL. By C. H. Dodd. Nisbet. 6s.

Students of the New Testament are already deeply indebted to the writer of this book. They have learned to look to him for leading and direction in certain new paths, unknown to the pre-war generation, but now in process of being opened up; and in this book they will find a further instalment of his thought.

It is true that they are likely to be surprised, perhaps in some cases disappointed, especially if they are not philosophically minded, as the nature of the book becomes clear to them. Probably the title will have led them to expect a discussion of the historical character of the Gospels as this expression is ordinarily understood. And they will find many valuable observations on this subject. Attention may be drawn particularly to the third chapter, which suggests some new and fruitful methods of studying the material given to us in the Gospels. But, in spite of its title, the book is concerned much more with philosophical than with historical issues; it cannot really be regarded as an historical inquiry; as such it would be too slight and superficial. Accepting and indeed welcoming (p. 14) the " shift of emphasis " in Gospel study, Dr Dodd proceeds with his usual insight and acumen to consider the principles and chief " motifs " of the new method, and to set forth the Gospel-revelation accordingly. But does his book help us to build a trustworthy bridge between the method of nineteenth-century criticism, which as he truly says was " the minute analysis and assessment of the Gospels as historical documents," and the more recent method, which emphasizes the religious and " eschatological " setting of the literature? Few readers, I believe, as they put the book down, will feel that they have been given a satisfying solution of those *particular* Gospel-problems which their study of the works of the scholars of the last generation had presented to them. And yet their hopes for such a solution have been not unjustifiably aroused. On the dust-cover we read that " the object of this book is to discuss the question of their [the Gospels'] value as historical material in view of the most recent developments in criticism," and on p. 48 that " it is the tradition concerning Jesus that we are to study." Both these statements would have been true of books on the Gospels published forty years ago. Nor is Dr Dodd unwilling, to use the phrase " the Jesus of history," pp. 67, 73; but the main thought of the book on these matters is given on p. 59, " The tradition underlying the New Testament writings and embodied in the *kerygma* is not simply historical but historical-eschatological "; and it is this thought which gives to the book its chief interest and value. It may be that the limitations imposed by

public lectures have made impossible an adequate treatment of particular problems, but our debt to Dr Dodd is too great to allow us to believe that this book gives us his full thought about the historical material in the Gospels. We hope that he will show us how we may preserve all that was valuable in the minute research and study of the last two generations, and at the same time adapt it to the new presentation of the Gospel on the much larger canvas, which he has now for some years been setting before us in a particularly stimulating and fruitful way. But it will need much more consideration of detail than was possible for him in this book.

It remains to draw attention to a point on which the writer dwells often and insistently—viz., that the Kingdom of God came in the complex of events connected with the ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. On this theme the author uses unequivocal language. The Gospels profess to report, he says, "the climax and end of history," p. 13, and again on p. 125, "The teaching of Jesus is . . . for those who have experienced the end of this world and the coming of the Kingdom of God." Dr Dodd does well to recall us to a side of the truth which our fathers had tended grievously to overlook; but is it, after all, more than one side of the truth? Is not the attitude of expectancy at least as strongly marked a feature of the New Testament as the experience of realization? Is it in accordance with New Testament teaching to use the expression "the end of this world" in connexion with the ministry, death and resurrection of the Lord? In his final chapter the writer shows us indeed how we are to understand his doctrine. "In Christianity," he says, "the teleological 'end' is other than the temporal end of the process. It is given in an event which entered into the course of history once for all, while the process still went on." We question whether in this matter it is desirable to go beyond the admirable statement on p. 37, "The historical order has received a specific character from the entrance into it of the eternal Word of God." This event, as Dr Dodd says elsewhere, gives meaning to all that went before, establishing the divine character of the process; and similarly, being experienced time after time throughout succeeding ages, it gives meaning to the whole subsequent process.

R. H. Lightfoot.

Memorandum on the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Christian Doctrine. By A. G. Hebert, S.S.M. Published for the Church Union by the S.P.C.K. 1s.

A reviewer of Fr Hebert's memorandum is not in a wholly easy position if he has himself been a member of the Archbishops' Commission. Obviously he has a joint responsibility with his colleagues for the Report; but equally obviously his

responsibility is not such as would attach to him had he written the Report alone. To some passages in the Report his attitude may always have been, " This is tolerable, but not what I should wish to say; and if I had had my way it would not have been said in this form," and it is right that he should make this clear. But he must be scrupulously careful not to express anything of the nature of a criticism of his colleagues, nor to detract anything from the rights that they possessed, in virtue of their membership, to make their own views perfectly plain and to try to effect their incorporation into the substance of the Report.

I would begin with a general appreciation and reservation. Fr Hebert's memorandum is an important contribution to the discussion of the Report. When I think of the fairmindedness which he displays I am tempted to add, *O si sic omnes!* In particular I welcome his precise denial of the suggestion that the Commission favoured an extreme fluidity of belief, and his recognition of the fact that the Commission has come down strongly on the side of orthodoxy with regard to the great doctrines of God, of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit. But now for my general reservation: I find in him (and to this point I shall return) a curious detachment from the realities of the Commission's procedure. He is apt to write as though certain things were possible which were not possible, and to forget what was involved in the appointment of a Commission, whose members one may think of as chosen because they disagreed with one another rather than because they agreed. Fr Hebert's central criticism of the Report is that it " fails to demonstrate the extent of existing agreement and to show how far it is possible to remove or diminish existing differences, because it does not track these differences down to their roots, indicate the historical causes which have led to them, and so point the way to a genuine synthesis of the positive theological principles to which the various schools bear witness." It is to the Prolegomena and to Part I that he makes this criticism specially apply. Up to a point I believe that he is right—that is, the Report does suffer here and there from an inadequacy of historical reference. He seems to me to overrate the effects of this inadequacy, and I greatly doubt whether in respect of some of the more controversial passages in the Report its supposed failure would have been rectified had the Commissioners gone to work in the manner outlined by Fr Hebert. But it would have been a gain if in certain sections an historical background had been supplied.

To follow Fr Hebert through all his criticisms would be too long a task: I limit myself to comments on his review of the Report in connexion with the subjects of Revelation, our Lord's Resurrection, the Virgin Birth, and Symbolism.

First as to Revelation: Fr Hebert affirms that the Report " allows a conception of Revelation radically different from that assumed in the Bible and the tradition of the Church." The

word " allows " is, anyhow, unfortunate, as it suggests powers which the Commission lacked. But apart from that, when Fr Hebert comes to argue his case, and starting from his own presuppositions as to Revelation, with which I could not agree in the precise form in which he states them, he does not do more than show that the Commission " allowed " within its account of the meaning of Revelation notions which, if taken in isolation, would involve that difference of conception to which he refers: they would express an immanentist and evolutionary view of Revelation. But as the Commission never intended any such isolation (Fr Hebert, of course, does not imply that it did), the case against the Commission at this point amounts, at the most, to the charge that it did not produce a synthesis and was not careful enough in its language.

When he comes to the section dealing with our Lord's Resurrection, Fr Hebert recognizes how much there is which is consonant with historic orthodoxy. He approves the four affirmations on pp. 84-85. But he notes the presence in the Report of another point of view; those who hold it will not commit themselves to belief in the truth of the Gospel accounts of the empty tomb and to the orthodox explanation thereof. Fr Hebert objects that the four affirmations (which represent the mind of the whole Commission) " are incompatible with the theology which denies our Lord's bodily Resurrection." So he thinks of the uninstructed reader as observing that " the Report allows the bodily Resurrection of our Lord to be left an open question." He ends with the inquiry, " Has not the Report failed here, in trying to go as far as possible in registering agreement where the truth of the matter demanded a radical disagreement ?" The answer is in the negative. For, first, there was no unreal agreement; radical disagreement appears on p. 84, where it is made quite clear that a minority of the Commissioners do not hold the traditional explanation of the empty tomb. Secondly, the four affirmations were real agreements. It is no use Fr Hebert saying that they are incompatible with the theology which denies the bodily Resurrection. He may think so; I may think so; but some of the Commissioners did not think so. Precisely here was that honest difference of opinion which Fr Hebert wants. What would Fr Hebert have done had he been on the Commission ? He might, but he might not, have convinced the dissentients; he could not have tried to suppress the minority view; he could not have said, " You shall not accept the affirmations because you combine them with an irreconcilable theology." It is arguable that this was a point where resignations from the Commission would have been in place or even that the Commission should have broken up. But, failing such a course, I am confident, as I believe that every member of the Commission would be, that no substantial alternative in respect of the content of this section is conceivable.

The section on the Virgin Birth in the Report is not impressive, and it is obvious that the Commission was in serious difficulties owing to its own lack of internal unity. But Fr Hebert goes too far in his criticisms. He seems to find in the Archbishop's word "recognize" (of the position which he does not hold) more than is really there. "Recognize" in the text is far nearer to "understand" than to "approve." And he finds a "flat contradiction" where none exists. To hold, as a number of the Commissioners do, that "belief in the Word made flesh is integrally bound up with belief in the Virgin Birth" implies, not that a person cannot believe in the Incarnation unless he also believes in the Virgin Birth, but that, viewed objectively, the fact of the Incarnation requires the fact of the Virgin Birth. If members of the Commission and others affirm belief in the Incarnation but deny the Virgin Birth, that must be accepted as their point of view, even though others may be sure that this is an internally unstable position and will be shown to be such. Is Fr Hebert prepared to say that Brunner does not fully accept the reality of our Lord's Incarnation? Brunner writes, "All depends upon the miracle of the Incarnation of the Son of God —in the strictly Pauline and Johannine sense; but nothing depends upon the manner in which it took place." I could not say that, and I quite disagree with Brunner as to there being any parallel between the doctrinal use of the notion of scriptural inerrancy and the doctrinal use of belief in the Virgin Birth. But to say that Brunner does not "fully accept" the reality of the Incarnation would be impossible for me.

Finally, as to Symbolism: I am not at ease with the Appended Note (pp. 37-38), but can regard it as tolerable because it does not at any point involve application to any particular article of the creed; because the phrase "it is not therefore of necessity illegitimate" gives no positive right of symbolic interpretation; and because this Note ought to be read along with the following Note on Assent, where the distinction between the doctrine of the Church and personal opinions of an authorized teacher is clearly drawn. The Commission has never suggested that it is or should be equally within the rights of an authorized teacher or of any member of the Church to affirm or to deny the Lord's Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of His body from the grave. Fr Hebert criticizes the Commission for not clearing up the ambiguity which it recognizes in connexion with the word "symbolic." But, so far as it goes, the distinction between two senses of the word, to which the Commission refers, is clear. The second sense is when the word is used to describe the value which statements may have "as pictorial expressions of spiritual truth," even though the supposed facts did not occur. Fr Hebert argues that, where history is concerned, symbolism comes in only if the facts took place; hence the symbolic meaning of the Virgin Birth and of the Resurrection depends on their

being historical facts. To which I would say that while the second sense recognized by the Commission is legitimate, its application will vary according as a particular person thinks a particular application reasonable or not. The Commissioners would not have been of one mind in their own applications. The Commission, in Fr Hebert's judgment, has failed to give the guidance and help which it might, and should, have done. It is possible that in this disappointment he speaks for many besides himself. But, given the terms of reference, given the differences in point of view within the Commission, differences which, however modified through the experience of mutual understandings and approximations, nevertheless remained to the end, and I doubt if the result should be considered either surprising or disheartening.

J. K. Mozley.

Studies in Keats: New and Old. By J. Middleton Murry. Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d.

Keats is harshly treated by the anthologies: caged with a crowd of parrots, lively linnets and stuffed cuckoos, no great poet is at his best. An anthology almost inevitably makes every poet appear as a song-writer or a writer of occasional verse: it conceals the significant development of a poet of the stature of Shakespeare or Wordsworth as effectively as a gramophone record of " Themes from the Great Composers " would sweep Beethoven and Mozart into the orbit of Vivaldi and Couperin. Then again, Keats died young, and he is still regarded and read as " a promising young man " or, with even less discrimination, as " one of the Romantics." If Mr Middleton Murry had done nothing more, his demonstration of the value of Keats would still be an important contribution to English criticism.

The present volume is a reprint, with two additional essays, of a volume that appeared in 1930. It can be regarded as a supplement to Mr Murry's *Keats and Shakespeare*, but anyone who does not know that book, and wishes to know what relation Mr Murry sees between poetry and religion, what he understands by spiritual development, and what development he sees in Keats, might well begin with the smaller book.

Mr Murry's method is one of close criticism: he does not expatiate on a general impression, but follows the text, using the Letters for illustration and enlightenment. Sometimes he engages in controversy—with Professor de Selincourt, for example, and Dr Tillyard—but not *merely* for the sake of factual or textual points. Whether he is discussing Milton's influence on Keats, or the authenticity of a passage in" The Fall of Hyperion," he is concerned with revealing the thought and sensibility of the poet, and he has the advantage of writing with unusual understanding of the process of writing poetry, and with an unusual

sense of the reality and importance of the issues with which Keats was concerned.

Keats was romantic in this sense: he believed in throwing himself open to every experience, in questioning every belief not proved upon his pulses, in persisting until he found an answer or a state of serenity. Other poets have tried to circumscribe human endeavour and human sensibility into a pagan "sixty seconds' worth of distance run" or a stoic resignation as in Gray or Housman, and perhaps some such limitation *must* be part and parcel of one's habits of mind before simple light-hearted lyric poetry is possible. But Keats did not accept that limitation. "Health and Spirits," he said, "can only belong unalloyed to the selfish Man—the Man who thinks much of his fellows can never be in Spirits. . . ." In some ways Keats's outlook resembled that of Christian mystics, and he saw the stages of experience much as they did. Mr Murry, after some enlightening criticism of the poetry, says, "*Endymion* is thus something more than a work of that joyful 'first period' which is familiar to us in the work of great poets and musicians: it is, essentially, a transition piece. It begins in a first period, and ends in a second."

In that second period Keats felt the reality of pain and evil. Like Wordsworth, he sought *de novo* for a religious solution of his problems: he could not, like Milton, take it ready-made from the Protestantism of his time. It is, and has been, the problem of other people besides Keats; and Mr Murry resolves the contrast between Keats and Shakespeare, on the one hand, and Milton on the other, into a contrast between what he calls the "feeling-types" of Catholic and Protestant—the Catholic type "more conscious than the Protestant type of the mystery of existence, and in particular of the mystery of suffering."

It is a dangerous use of words, and would lead to some nice confusion if compounded with the use of "classic" and "romantic," but it serves to point some very percipient criticism and to deepen our understanding not only of Keats but of religion itself.

MICHAEL ROBERTS.

THE EARLY EUCHARIST. By Felix L. Cirlot. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

The study of the origin of the Eucharist has been difficult in the past for English students, for so few books on the subject have been published in England, and the many excellent German and French works dealing with this subject are not always accessible in our libraries. In this respect Dr Cirlot has met a very great need, and in the 270 pages of this book he has packed an unbelievable amount of detailed material. The evidence the author has collected from the Apostolic Fathers is so considerable that the well arranged index, quite apart from the book itself, will prove of infinite value to any student of this

problem, and the equally well ordered bibliography is by no means a limited one.

Nevertheless, however valuable a thesis may prove to be to a student, there is always a difficulty in making it attractive to the ordinary reader; and one would not have to read the preface to realize that this particular work was first of all presented as a thesis for an advanced theological degree. Perhaps the difficulty of the ordinary reader is increased by the author's frequent use of brackets, in places where the English writer would normally use commas, and it is also rather disturbing to find such cumbersome phrases as " the very most original forms " (p. 32).

Dr Cirlot is to be congratulated on his boldness in attack. So many works of this kind have been spoilt by long and wearisome discussions on chronology, but in the first sentence the author makes it quite plain that he accepts Nisan 14 as the actual date of the Last Supper and Crucifixion. Consequently he is able to proceed without delay, untrammelled by Passover theories, to form a constructive plan of the origin of the Eucharist, and, despite the mass of evidence which is produced, the admirable summaries at the end of each chapter mean that the reader is able to grasp the decisive conclusion which the author has reached.

He starts with the premiss that Jesus and His disciples formed a " Haburah "—a society of comrades or friends—and these Harburoth, well within pre-Christian times, had the custom of meeting at the house of one of the members for a social meal, and Cirlot interprets the Last Supper, and all the common meals which Jesus and His disciples must often have taken together, in terms of this custom. In a precise and clear manner he summarizes the outstanding features of the Haburah meal which concern the study of Eucharistic origins.

A. " A preliminary informal ' course,' taken seated, in which each one blesses for himself the articles of food or drink brought to him. . . .

B. " The formal meal is taken reclining. It is opened with the blessing and breaking of bread by one leader for all present. . . .

C. " At the conclusion comes the ' grace after meals,' called the food blessing, said also by one leader for all present . . . on special occasions of joy, etc., it is said over a common cup called the ' Cup of Blessing.' . . .

D. " Finally, after all this, comes the Kiddush Cup, blessed with a double (wine- and day-) blessing. It, too, is a common cup and blessed by one leader for the whole group. This is found in the meal on the eves of Sabbaths or great feasts."

Cirlot shows that it was B and C which Jesus invested with a new significance, and from which we derive the Eucharistic acts.

The author deals fully with the problem of the Agape in its

relationship to the Eucharist. Some scholars have denied the existence of a common meal apart from the Eucharist . . . others have argued that the Agape came first and the Eucharist developed out of it. Dr Cirlot asserts that the Eucharist and Agape were originally distinct but not separate. The two acts, so well known to us, were recognized from the earliest days as the Eucharist, but found their place at the beginning and end of the common meal. Then, in certain areas, abuses, or Roman legal difficulties, led to the abandonment of the meal, but the Eucharist itself naturally had to survive. As long as the Eucharist and Agape were united the consecration prayers were widely separated. Once the break was made it was a simple process to unite the two prayers into one prayer of consecration. " The second innovation would be due to the fact that once the Eucharist was separated from the Agape it would be much too short to constitute a satisfactory complete service. Hence it would very quickly, possibly even from the very first time of its separation from the Agape, be united to the already existing Christian service modelled on the Jewish service of the synagogue " (p. 46). The Agape may or may not have survived in local churches, but once the Eucharist was completely disconnected from it, it ceased to be of any interest for our particular study.

While it is true to say that the first two chapters dealing with this development are the most interesting in Dr Cirlot's work, it does not mean that the major portion of the book lacks interest. He collects a wealth of support from Ignatius, Irenæus, and Hippolytus, for his argument that " the Church's teaching was, and from time immemorial had been, a strict and literal realism," and in his examination of the sacrificial teaching of the first two centuries he insists on ποιεῖτε being translated in the sacrificial sense " offer." He deals with ποιεῖτε under a separate heading in Appendix IV, and when it is realized that there are eight appendices and in all 85 pages, full of detailed evidence too profuse for the ordinary text, the reader will realize something of the immense labour Dr Cirlot's thesis must have involved.

H. L. Franklin.

The Religious Vocation. By Richard Meux Benson; edited by H. P. Bull, S.S.J.E., with an introduction by Lucius Cary, S.S.J.E. Mowbray. 7s. 6d.

In Fr Benson's own commentary on the Cowley Rule of Life we have something of a rarity, a founder's own lights upon his formal text. And for followers and students of that rule this is most valuable. For what leads to dissension and schism in religious congregations is the interpretation not of the word but of the spirit of the founder. The varieties of Franciscanism, the deep cleavages between the different schools of Benedictin-

ism, are due not to something doubtful in the teaching of Francis or Benedict, but to differences in their followers' apprehension of their spirit. The Cowley ethos is something entirely of its own; it owes its debt to history, but its origin and inspiration are in the character and wisdom of Richard Meux Benson. His own beautifully lucid exposition of the spirituality which made him should do a great deal to save his institution from future controversy upon the subject.

Any consideration of his foundation must, then, be based upon the spirit of Fr Benson himself. Fr Lucius Cary wisely devotes his very capable introductory essay to an analysis of the founder, showing him, in turn, as prophet, mystic and disciple of the beloved disciple. It is the mystic who predominates here. One is constantly astonished at the sureness of his grasp of spiritual realities. He speaks of God as one who knows God, of heaven as one who lives there. And this heavenliness—not mere otherworldliness—is stamped upon his plan for his society. The religious vocation is not separate from the rest of life; it is part of God's vocation for the whole Church; asceticism is merely a means towards living the life of heaven.

Such a view of our existence never leads to relaxation; it tends inevitably to a reform of manners. St Benedict's *conversio morum* is rigidly demanded of all who would follow the Cowley Rule. Every action and thought is to be related to God and belongs to the community, whose true value is that " in the unity of a common grace we become partakers of one another's grace." But the vigour and sternness of the constant mortification of such a life is ever faced in the light of Christ and in union with Him, whence come its true joy and sweetness.

Much of the book is of great value to the ordinary Christian. But in Fr Benson's treatment of prayer one or two points suggest the limitations of post-Tridentine piety. In the chapters on Communion and the divine Office one misses any reference to their aspect as acts of the Church rather than of the individual; and, in the same way, there seems to be too much stress upon the part of mental prayer in the spiritual life. Certain passages, on superficial reading, might open the way to the freaks of a Louismet.

But the key of his spirituality is found rather in the exquisite chapter on Confession. For the basis of his thought was penitence, a sorrow for sin which, radiant with the love of God, seeks ever to make itself commensurate with sin. It is the penitence of a great religious who, surprisingly, realized that " the existence of smaller communities than the whole Church certainly implies something wanting, some imperfection in the state of Christendom."

FRANK DE JONGE.

THE ORIGINS OF THE REFORMATION. By James Mackinnon. Longmans. 16s.

In his comprehensive study of Luther and the Reformation Dr Mackinnon has already shown his keen interest in the cultural continuity of the sixteenth century with those immediately preceding it. His new book may be called an introduction to his previous Lutheran studies, for much of what he has implied in the latter is here discussed and expanded. Dr Mackinnon's theme is by no means a new one—in fact in many places we find ourselves traversing very well-worn ground—but he manages to make his points emerge concisely and competently from a mass of miscellaneous material, and students of the history of religion in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries will be much in his debt, not only for what he says, but also for the copious references contained in footnotes.

Dr Mackinnon traces the first emergence of the ideas of the sixteenth-century reformers to the struggle between the Pope and the Emperor Ludwig of Bavaria, or rather to the scholastic debate between the papal and imperial champions that kept pace with the actual quarrel, to which debate he devotes a useful chapter (we may, perhaps, forgive the author if in his attempt to compress a discussion on Dante's political thought into less than four pages he contents himself with a mere abstract of the *De Monarchia*). Dr Mackinnon is evidently at home in his studies of Wyclif and Hus, to which he devotes a considerable part of his book. He is happier in placing them in their rather conjectural relationship to the Reformation than he is in his chapter on medieval thought (pp. 340 ff.), a subject on which one feels he moves a little uncertainly, and in which he is content to rely for reference to secondary sources rather than to the works of the Schoolmen themselves. We are already in the author's debt for his insistence on the influence which the German mystics of the fifteenth century had upon Luther—an influence far greater than that of humanism upon the Reformation in its characteristically German phase. It is probably impossible to understand Luther's subjectivism and independence of outward aids to religion unless we are thoroughly acquainted with the outlook of Meister Eckhart, Tauler, and the Gottesfreunde. We may speculate and make conjectures as to Luther's debt to Wyclif, to the protagonists of conciliar reform, or to Erasmus and the humanists, but here we have a clear line of development, though where the mystics strive to perfect God's will by shutting themselves off from the world, Luther, with the ardent fervour of the "twice-born" convert, is anxious to proclaim his message far and wide.

A few small criticisms occur to us. The references to the *English Historical Review* might in all cases give page or pages as well as volume, as on p. 81. De Wulf's *History of Medieval Philosophy* is in two volumes—Dr Mackinnon is, presumably,

referring to the English translation—and therefore on p. 343, n. 9, the volume number should be given. The name of the Principal of St Edmund Hall is Emden, not "Embden" (p. 247, n. 35). Dr Previté-Orton is alluded to, on p. 61, as "Privitè-Orton," and elsewhere with a *grave* accent. The author of *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* is Burckhardt, not "Burchhardt," as on p. 277. The Fraticelli appear as "Fracticelli" on p. 310. Two further points occur with regard to the index—would it not have been possible to index the footnotes as well as the text? And again, there is a rather pointless inconsistency in the entries—why do some authorities appear with Christian names or initials after their surnames, some with Dr or Mr (or, erroneously, "Dean," as in the case of Dr W. R. Inge), and some (*e.g.*, Renan) without any prefix at all?

BEATRICE HAMILTON THOMPSON.

ART EXHIBITIONS

EARLY WORK OF STANLEY SPENCER. Leger and Son, 13, Old Bond Street.

ILLUSTRATIONS BY GEORGES ROUAULT. Zwemmer Gallery, Charing Cross Road.

These exhibitions are of the works of two Christian artists. Rouault is a Roman Catholic working in Paris, and Spencer is one of the sons of a church organist at Cookham.

It is a great relief to see paintings which break away from the monotony of the multitudes of landscapes, still-lifes, and figure-studies that normally cover the walls of exhibitions. It is not that modern painting is devoid of mere subject-matter, nor does it lack the very substance of art, design and colour; these things have never been more wonderfully exploited than they are to-day. What it does lack is something more fundamental, which is associated with the motive, the *raison d'être* of art. It is this that religious insight can provide, transforming art from being a comparatively trifling activity into something tremendous and profound.

Spencer and Rouault paint with Christian insight. Spencer's magnificent large-scale "Unveiling of the Cookham War Memorial" expresses, for instance, a spiritual unity in the crowd of uplifted faces closely packed together. A sense of the permanence of individual human personality, dead or alive, seems to underlie his preoccupation with "Resurrection" scenes, and the same might be said of the little painting with the astonishing title "John Donne arriving in Heaven." Rouault repeatedly paints circus girls and clowns and street women, and

seems to see in them all something of the eternal theme of the "suffering servant."

Both artists have been led on to attempt to paint the Gospel events themselves. Thus, although it may at first seem blasphemous, Rouault has found it only one step to pass from his studies of the faces of clowns and prostitutes to the face of Christ Himself. Spencer has similarly been able to pass from the spiritual unity of the crowd at the war memorial to that of the disciples at "The Last Supper."

The spiritual and technical difficulties involved in religious painting are expressed in the following passage quoted from a collection of essays by Maritain (a friend of Rouault). "Considering the essential inadequacy of the means of expression of human art in relation to the divine mysteries to which they are applied, the excruciating difficulty of expressing in a sensitive medium truths which cleave the earth and sky and unite the most opposed realities, religious art must always retain some element of hieratic and so to speak ideographical symbolism, and of the strong intellectuality of its primitive traditions." This explains to some extent why both Rouault and Spencer have adopted such extraordinary techniques. Rouault adopts the traditions of the stained-glass window, with his great thick black lines and jewel-like colours. Moreover, he rarely paints on canvas, but prefers the painfully difficult process of "colour printing." How the passionate feeling in his pictures is expressed through such a rigid technique is past comprehension.

Spencer's style might be called ascetic. For instance, in "The Last Supper" there is nothing pleasing or graceful in the superficial sense. Instead, there is a profound feeling of restraint; only the things and shapes essential to the composition are painted, and these are studied with meticulous precision. In this rigidity the sudden movement at the breaking of the bread has an overwhelming effect. The whole style has its traditions in Italian fourteenth-century art.

It might be argued that it is just this subservience to tradition from which art has been struggling to free itself for the last century. But "art is always the result of some constraint. To think that it rises higher in proportion as it is free is to think that what keeps the kite from climbing the sky is the string to which it is attached. Art longs for liberty only in times of sickness. Whenever it feels itself strong, it looks for struggle and obstacles" (André Gide). The work of Rouault and Spencer shows that in art, as in everything else, limitations are the very means of achievement.

GILBERT N. WALTON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: C. M. Duncan-Jones (Ed.), *An Outline of Church History*, vol. iii. (4s. 6d.).

G. BELL AND SONS: R. Graham, *An Essay on English Monasteries* (2s.).

CAR. BEYAERT (Bruges): C. Callewaert, *De Breviarii Romani Liturgia* (45 Belg. fr.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: Fr. Cuthbert, *The Mystery of the Redemption* (6s.); D. J. Leahy, *St. Augustine on Eternal Life* (5s.); *Prayers from the Psalms* (1s.); A. Roche, *These Animals of Ours* (3s. 6d.); G. Webb, *The Liturgical Altar* (3s. 6d.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: W. L. Knox, *St Paul and the Church of the Gentiles* (15s.).

THE CENTENARY PRESS: N. Berdyaev, *Spirit and Reality* (8s. 6d.); M. J. Congar, *Divided Christendom* (12s. 6d.).

CHURCH LITERATURE ASSOCIATION: Sister Hilda, *St Teresa*; Sister of C.S.M.V., *St Catherine of Siena* (1s. each); A. E. Russell, *Treasures of the Psalter* (9d.); W. R. Alderson, *The Mass* (6d.); Martin Marprelate, Junior, *Lords over God's Heritage?* (4d.); M. Donavan, *Leisure and Pleasure* and *Why Bother about Baptism?* (3d. each); A Layman, *Why go to Church?* C. S. Drew, *Saints or Worthies* (2d.).

COLDWELL: Cardinal Faulhaber, *The Women of the Bible* (7s. 6d.).

DENT: R. Gurner, *We Crucify* (5s.).

DESCLÉE, DE BROUWER (Paris): W. Goossens, *De Cooperatione Immediata Matris Redemptoris ad Redemptionem Objectivam*, n.p.

EDITIONS EUGÈNE FIGUIÈRE (Paris): M. Rudwin, *Les écrivains diaboliques de France* (4s.).

INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL: *The World Mission of the Church*, Tambaram, 1938 (1s. 6d.).

W. KOHLHAMMER (Stuttgart): Gerhard Kittel, *Christus und Imperator* (M. 1.20).

LONGMANS: P. Green, *The Gospel Story* (2s. 6d.); Desmond Hawkins, *Hawk among the Sparrows* (7s. 6d.); C. O. Hoste, *The Partnership of Nazareth* (6s.); C. Lattey, *The First Book of Psalms* (5s. 6d.)—The Westminster Version.

MOREHOUSE PUBLISHING CO. (New York): F. E. Wilson, Bishop of Eau Claire, *Faith and Practice* ($2.50).

MOWBRAYS: W. J. Carey, *The Search for God* (6d.); A. L. Watson, *The Living Prayer* (2s.).

JOHN MURRAY: S. Angus, *Essential Christianity* (6s.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: A. Orn, *The Journals of Kierkegaard*, 1834-1854 (25s.); A. P. D'Entrèves, *The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought* (8s. 6d.); C. S. Lewis, *Rehabilitations and Other Essays* (7s. 6d.).

RELIGIOUS BOOK CLUB: A. E. Southon, *On Eagles' Wings* (2s. 6d.); W. Teeling, *Crisis for Christianity* (2s. 6d.).

SKEFFINGTON: G. A. Birmingham, *God's Hour* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: *Handbook of Christian Teaching* (4s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: R. Rouse, *The Commonwealth of Man* (1s.); H. H. Rowley, *Israel's Mission to the World* (3s. 6d.).

PIERRE TÉQUI (Paris): R. Simeterre, *La Théorie Socratique de la Vertu—Science selon les Mémorables de Xénophon* (fr. 17.70).

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